An SDN-Based NAC Implementation to Recognise Indicators of a Compromise via Malicious DNS Queries


Raymond C. Nunez Paul Patrick C. Prantilla

What is this Project about?

- Use SDN to implement common Network Access Control (NAC) functionality that has can be easily extended.
- Implement using cheap machines (Raspberry Pis) and common SDN-compatible switches.
- Use optimizations to reduce operations and queries performed by the SDN controller when detecting compromises.


What makes SDNs great?

Finally paves way for an official standard for decoupling the control layer from the forwarding layer in network devices.




Source : https://www.opennetworking.org

Basic SDN Topology




The Problem of "Packet-In"

Vulnerable to DDOS using Packet-In or simple overuse. This leads to instability in the Control Plane.




Instability in the Control Plane



Insert, Delete or Modify Flow

Switch receive too many packets and send many Packet-In messages before the controller installs the new flow entries.

Changes in OpenFlow 1.3 that Mitigates this Problem



The "Meter" limits the rate of packets in a group of flows by the number of packets or bytes. We can use "Meter" to limit the rate of a group of Packet-In messages.

NAC in a Nutshell

- Controls entry into an access network
- Controls capability of nodes in an access network




What we wanted - The Short Story

Intercept DNS queries from network clients and forward the queries to the SDN Controller.



Look up the **A or CNAME** record in the DNS query using a local dictionary cache of blacklisted sites and/or online API.



If found...


Move the device that sent the DNS query to a remediation VLAN


Implementation Approaches



Our Setup

- HP 2960 OpenFlow Compatible Switch Thank you UPCC
- 4x Raspberry Pi 2 (ARMv7 900MHz Quad Core 1GB RAM)
 - SDN Controller
 - Server
 - Client 1
 - Client 2
- 6 Port 40Watt USB Charger
- Wireless Access point for OOBM







Demo

Challenges

- HP Switch can support OpenFlow 1.3 but POX only supports OpenFlow 1.0
- There is no way to easily change VLAN IDs per port.
- There is no direct way to shutdown a port to retrigger a DHCP lease.
- Virus Total is a constantly updated database of 63 AV solutions. But the Free VT API limits free users to 4 queries a minute

Remediation VLAN Script

```
switchvlan.sh
                                                                     UNREGISTERED
        switchvlan.sh
                          ×
      #!/bin/bash
  3
      PORT=$1
      VLAN=$2
      IPADDRESS="192.168.10.1"
      PASSWORD="al********"
      echo "Changing $PORT to VLAN $VLAN"
  8
      (sleep 2; echo "$PASSWORD"; sleep 2; echo "x"; sleep; \
 10
          echo "config terminal"; sleep 2; echo "vlan $VLAN"; sleep 1; \
 11
          echo "untagged $PORT"; sleep 1; \
 12
          echo "interface ethernet $PORT";sleep 1; \
 13
          echo "disable"; sleep 15; echo "enable"; sleep 1; \
 14
          echo "logout"; sleep 1; echo "y"; sleep 1; echo "n") | \
 15
      socat - EXEC:"ssh -l manager $IPADDRESS",pty,setsid,ctty
 16
 17
      echo "Done"
 18
Line 1, Column 1
                                                       Tab Size: 4
                                                                    Shell Script (Bash)
```

Experimental Setup

- State University Network
- Total Upstream bandwidth of 1.3 Gbps from 3 ISPs
- Dual Stack IPv4 and IPv6
- 15,000 Users (8,000 Peak Concurrent)

Optimization - Whitelisting

Whitelisting of the popular domains below would cut lookups by as much as 60%

Domain	Page Views	Percentage
facebook.com	70,000,000	43.7%
google.com	10,000,000	6.4%
akamaihd.net	8,000,000	5.2%
yahoo.com	4,240,000	OVER 60° 111
dropbox.com	4,000,000	2.5%

Optimization - Caching

Cache Domain Query results to a malicious and nonmalicious list.

Full List

www.google.com
www.g00gle.com
www.f4ce4book.com
www.mal0x8.com
www.yahoo1.com
www.yahoo.com
www.facebook4u.com
www.facebook.com
www.facebook.com

Non-Malicious

www.google.com www.facebook.com www.cnn.com

.....

Malicious

www.g00gle.com www.f4ce4book.com www.facebook4u.com www.mal0x8.com

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Thank you!