

ONCE MORE UNTO THE DATA BREACH

Steve Miller

2,122+ data breaches in 2014

-Verizon DBIR

The average cost of a data breach will be \$150 million by 2020

-Juniper Research

Today I will pontificate on...

- The attacker toolset ✕
- A data breach 🕸
- Common failures 🕸_🕸
- Changing the equation ⚠



The evolving attacker toolset





Progression of C2 protocols

EASY

HTTP

Self-signed SSL

Fake SSL

Legit SSL

HARD

```
GET /?
2dmABApPZ9wUD04wMvJGHk~NeZ7kuRjdjo077DC6EpvjIsGqQ0~Xo~9
Pn3iDKore3qksua_QU72UyvpaIT~J1rHA53d3U4furUq7oCUNUyMH_9
WPHS~PSIIyE6cx0_XDhG412BhP9YgIW5nHL0Iu~eXrxaW_3PTN_3tda
90NLemg1Wkpa~xxXpZhMcyJ_eg-- HTTP/1.1
Connection: keep-alive
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml
Referer: http://www.google.com/
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows I
```



Progression of C2 protocols



Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number:

ec:32:09:67:c9:34:3f:50

Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption

Issuer: C=US, ST=North Carolina, L=Salisbury,
Widgits Pty Ltd, OU=VeriSign Trust Network, CN=ITU
Server/emailAddress=marry.smith@ltu.edu

Validity

Not Before: Nov 2 06:24:29 2011 GMT

Not After : Oct 30 06:24:29 2021 GMT

Subject: C=US, ST=North Carolina, L=Salisbury,
Widgits Pty Ltd, OU=VeriSign Trust Network, CN=ITU
Server/emailAddress=marry.smith@ltu.edu

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption

RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)

Modulus (1024 bit):

00:cd:b9:de:1a:82:7b:27:61:39:e2:
b3:f6:76:f9:4a:b3:42:9f:af:70:e7:



HTTP

Self-signed SSL

Fake SSL

Legit SSL

DETECTION

DEVELOPMENT

HARD

Content Type: Handshake (22)

Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)

Length: 177


```

40 55 39 81 b3 ea 00 1c b1 d4 1d c1 08 00 45 00 @U9..... .
00 de 3f 49 40 00 7f 06 78 0b 94 cb 95 87 ca 83 ..?I@... x
4e ef cb b5 01 bb 77 58 ae 04 c0 6c 64 b4 50 18 N....wX .
01 02 d2 92 00 00 16 03 01 00 b1 01 00 00 ad 03 ..... .
03 53 d7 13 73 . .S..s... J
F..?'`.\. .
q....+./ .
.....3 .
...../.A .

```



Progression of C2 protocols



The exemplar data breach





Log On to Windows

 Microsoft
Windows Server 2003
Standard Edition


Copyright © 1985-2003 Microsoft Corporation 

User name:

Password:

Log on to:  (this computer) ▼

☐ Log on using dial-up connection



StopWCS

Uninstall
WCS

Recycle Bin

C:\temp\log

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Search Folders

Address C:\temp\log

Go

Name	Size	Type	Date Modified	Attributes
acc1.txt	1 KB	Text Document	7/23/2014 1:24 AM	A
gs4.zip	252 KB	Compressed (zipped) ...	7/22/2014 11:54 PM	A
h.txt	247 KB	Text Document	7/22/2014 11:54 PM	A
mm64.txt	99 KB	Text Document	7/23/2014 12:31 AM	A
p4.txt	379 KB	Text Document	7/15/2014 2:31 AM	A
sock5.zip	743 KB	Compressed (zipped) ...	7/21/2014 10:16 PM	A
w1.txt	331 KB	Text Document	7/15/2014 3:20 AM	A
w64.txt	81 KB	Text Document	7/15/2014 2:32 AM	A
wmi.vbs	11 KB	VBScript Script File	7/23/2014 2:21 AM	A

Start



Command Prompt

C:\temp\log

My Computer

12:03 AM

D:\IBM\hcf

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Back Search Favorites


Copying...


2012-12-... .pptx
From ... to hcf

3 Minutes Remaining

	Date Modified	Attributes
	6/13/2013 2:17 AM	A
	6/10/2013 9:26 AM	A
	6/10/2013 9:23 AM	A
	4/9/2013 4:26 AM	A
	10/11/2010 5:31 AM	A
	6/13/2013 2:16 AM	A
	6/13/2013 2:17 AM	A
	4/16/2013 10:31 AM	A
	3/21/2013 10:49 AM	A
	4/10/2013 4:25 AM	A
	4/16/2013 10:49 AM	A
	12/13/2010 6:16 AM	A
	8/11/2010 2:45 AM	A
	8/11/2010 2:32 AM	A
	8/11/2010 2:53 AM	A
	12/6/2011 8:23 AM	A
	1/23/2012 8:24 AM	A
	3/20/2013 8:47 AM	A
	12/19/2011 5:04 PM	A
	1/24/2012 4:11 AM	A
	3/21/2013 5:50 AM	A
	12/16/2011 2:17 AM	A
	5/2/2012 5:55 PM	A
	8/28/2012 2:27 AM	A
	3/20/2013 5:29 AM	A
	2/25/2013 3:39 AM	A
	2/14/2013 9:33 AM	A
	12/14/2012 10:55 AM	A

Start Command Prom... C:\temp\log IBM\hcf accI.txt - Not... 2:42 AM







The data stolen

- The attacker was interested in **fuel cells**
- Key words in file names:
 - Shipping plan
 - Project marketing
 - Distribution providers
 - Market strategy
 - Regional sales plan
 - Advertising
 - 2015 marketing
 - Product roadmap
 - ~~Technical details~~
 - Schematics
 - ~~Engineering diagrams~~
 - ~~CAD files~~



The numbers

- 20 compromised systems
- 10 compromised accounts
- 7 custom utilities
- 1 piece of malware
- “Anti-forensics” techniques

Common failure points

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Sometimes it's hard to...

- Patch vulnerabilities
- Know all your egress points
- Block IPs and domains
- Reset accounts



Changing the equation





What if the attackers are kinda like us?

- They divide tasks groups
- They have their own recruiting departments
- They have goals and KPIs
- They outsource work when it makes sense
- They love their jobs
- They research and continuously innovate



What are some good assumptions?

- The attack surface is bigger than think
- Attackers **evolve** way faster than you do
- Your goal is to not to prevent the breach



How do I become more nimble?

- Inventory your knowledge and **get smarter**
- Find technology that can learn and grow
- Come up with a **plan** and **practice**

Thanks errybody!