How To Shot Web

(Better hacking in 2015)

bugcrowd

whoami

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- Bugcrowd
- Director of Technical Ops
- Hacker & Bug hunter
- #1 on all-time leaderboard bugcrowd 2014







What this talk's about...

Hack Stuff Better (and practically)

And...LOTS of memes.... only some are funny

More Specifically

Step 1: Cut a hole in a box... j/k

Step 1: Started with my bug hunting methodology

Step 2: Parsed some of the top bug hunters' research (web/mobile only for now)

Step 3: Create kickass preso

Topics? BB philosophy shifts, discovery techniques, mapping methodology, parameters oft attacked, useful fuzz strings, bypass or filter evasion techniques, new/awesome tooling

Philosophy

Differences from standard testing




Single-sourced

- looking mostly for common-ish vulns
- not competing with others
- incentivized for count
- payment based on sniff test

Crowdsourced

- looking for vulns that aren't as easy to find
- racing vs. time
- competitive vs. others
- incentivized to find unique bugs
- payment based on impact not number of findings

The regular methodologies






Discovery

Find the road less traveled

^ means find the application (or parts of an application) less tested.

- 1. *.acme.com scope is your friend
- 2. Find domains via Google (and others!)
 - a. Can be automated well via recon-ng and other tools.
- 3. Port scan for obscure web servers or services (on all domains)
- 4. Find acquisitions and the bounty acquisition rules
 - a. Google has a 6 month rule
- 5. Functionality changes or re-designs
- 6. Mobile websites
- 7. New mobile app versions



Tool: Recon-ng script (enumall.sh)

```
#!/bin/bash

# Subdomain enumeration script that creates/uses a dynamic resource script for recon-ng.
# only 1 module needs api's (/api/google_site) find instructions for that on the wiki.
# Or you can comment out that module.
# uses google scraping, bing scraping, baidu scraping, netcraft, and bruteforces to find subdomains.
# by @jhaddix
# input from command-line becomes domain to test
```

root@kali:~/Desktop# ./enumall.sh paypal.com

After it's done, a quick "show hosts" in the recon-ng prompt:

host	ip_address	region	country	latitude	longitude
accounts.paypal.com	66.211.168.93	1			L
active-www.paypal.com	173.0.84.34	İ	j	į	İ
active-www.paypal.com	173.0.88.34	İ	j	İ	
active-www.paypal.com	173.0.88.2	İ	j	İ	i
active-www.paypal.com	173.0.84.2	İ	ĺ	i .	i
ad.paypal.com	23.214.17.245	į .		i e	i e
advertising.paypal.com	23.214.16.211	i	j	İ	İ
announcements.paypal.com	173.0.88.130	İ	ĺ	į	
announcements.paypal.com	173.0.84.130	İ	ĺ		i
api-3t.sandbox.paypal.com	23.5.251.42	İ	ĺ		İ
api.sandbox.paypal.com	23.5.251.39	İ		İ	İ
apps.paypal.com	66.211.188.15	1		İ	İ
autodiscover.paypal.com	64.68.79.242		ĺ	İ	İ
beta.paypal.com	192.69.184.181		ĺ	İ	İ
blueprint.paypal.com	66.211.188.151	ĺ	ĺ	İ	İ
business.sandbox.paypal.com	173.0.82.91	İ	ĺ	İ	į .
cms.paypal.com	23.213.190.233	İ	ĺ	İ	İ
coupons.paypal.com	23.214.16.211	j	į	i	İ
creditcenter.paypal.com	208.76.140.163	İ		i	j

LMGTFY



site:paypal.com -www.paypal.com -www.sandbox

Google Search

I'm Feeling Lucky

LMGTFY

About 462,000 results (0.47 seconds)

Bill Me Later

https://creditapply.paypal.com/ ▼

Bill Me Later® is the fast simple and secure way to pay or

Bill Me Later® is the fast, simple and secure way to pay online without using a credit card at more than 1000 stores. Simply select Bill Me Later at checkout.

PayPal: Error - Login United States

https://business.paypal.com/ ▼

Login securely to your PayPal United States account. PayPal - the safer, easier way to pay online, send money and accept payments.

PayPal Shopping - PayPal Shopping Offers:

https://shopping.paypal.com/offers ▼ PayPal ▼

PayPal Shopping is the online shopping destination where you'll find exclusive deals, offers & coupons at 1000+ stores. Buy Now, Pay Later. Find offers.

PayPal Media Network

https://advertising.paypal.com/ ▼ Where.com ▼

Navigation. About Us \cdot Mobile and Online \cdot Mobile Targeting \cdot Online Targeting \cdot

Creative · Offers · News and Events · Ad Specs; MediaKit PDF; Terms and ...

List of mergers and acquisitions by Facebook

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

March 25, 2014	Oculus VR	Virtual reality technology	USA, Irvine, CA	\$2,000,000,000	
March 27, 2014	Ascenta	High-altitude UAVs	UK, Somerset, England	\$20,000,000	
April 24, 2014	ProtoGeo Oy	Fitness tracking app Moves	Finland, Helsinki	undisclosed	
August 7, 2014	PrivateCore	Secure Server Technology	USA, Palo Alto, CA	undisclosed	
August 26, 2014	WaveGroup Sound	Sound Studio	USA, Burlingame, CA	undisclosed	
January 6, 2015	Wit.ai	Speech recognition	USA, Palo Alto, California	undisclosed	
January 8, 2015	Quickfire		■ USA	undisclosed	
	March 27, 2014 April 24, 2014 August 7, 2014 August 26, 2014 January 6, 2015	March 27, 2014 Ascenta April 24, 2014 ProtoGeo Oy August 7, 2014 PrivateCore August 26, 2014 WaveGroup Sound January 6, 2015 Wit.ai	March 27, 2014 Ascenta High-altitude UAVs April 24, 2014 ProtoGeo Oy Fitness tracking app Moves August 7, 2014 PrivateCore Secure Server Technology August 26, 2014 WaveGroup Sound Studio January 6, 2015 Wit.ai Speech recognition	March 27, 2014 Ascenta High-altitude UAVs April 24, 2014 ProtoGeo Oy Fitness tracking app Moves → Finland, Helsinki August 7, 2014 PrivateCore Secure Server Technology WaveGroup Sound Sound Sound Wit.ai Speech recognition WK, Somerset, England → Finland, Helsinki WSA, Palo Alto, CA ■ USA, Burlingame, CA	March 27, 2014 Ascenta High-altitude UAVs ₩ UK, Somerset, England \$20,000,000 April 24, 2014 ProtoGeo Oy Fitness tracking app Moves ➡ Finland, Helsinki undisclosed August 7, 2014 PrivateCore Secure Server Technology ➡ USA, Palo Alto, CA undisclosed August 26, 2014 WaveGroup Sound Sound Studio ➡ USA, Burlingame, CA undisclosed January 6, 2015 Wit.ai Speech recognition ■ USA, Palo Alto, California undisclosed

Facebook Bug Bounties

October 14, 2014 at 9:52am @

XSS

http://www.breaksec.com/?p=5713
http://www.nirgoldshlager.com/2013/01/another-stored-xss-in-facebookcom.html
https://nealpoole.com/blog/2011/03/xss-vulnerability-in-facebook-translations/
https://nealpoole.com/blog/2011/08/lessons-from-facebooks-security-bug-bounty-program/
http://paulosyibelo.blogspot.com/2014/07/the-unseen-facebook-bug-bounty-2014-x.html
http://blog.prakharprasad.com/2014/08/facebook-friendfeed-stored-xss.html
http://medu554.blogspot.com/2014/02/stored-xss-on-atlassolutions-facebook.html
http://blog.ptsecurity.com/2013/10/a-story-about-xss-on-facebook.html
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NQOK9-OXwsc (http://pastebin.com/raw.php?
i=cuYRhM71)

http://www.websecresearch.com/2014/02/facebooks-boltpeterscom-configuration.html http://nbsriharsha.blogspot.in/2014/03/finally-facebook-hunted.html http://blog.fin1te.net/post/64715656088/content-types-and-xss-facebook-studio http://en.internetwache.org/facebook-fixes-minor-issues-02-05-2014/http://silentzzz.blogspot.com/2007/11/facebook-xss-vulnerability.html http://habrahabr.ru/company/pt/blog/247709/https://web.archive.org/web/20120416034642/http://gill.is/2012/04/11/new_website

Logic

http://www.nirgoldshlager.com/2013/01/how-i-hacked-facebook-employees-secure.html http://pwndizzle.blogspot.in/2014/07/breaking-facebooks-text-captcha.html

Race Conditions

http://josipfranjkovic.blogspot.com/2015/04/race-conditions-on-facebook.html

Open Redirect (\$500+)

http://thekaitokid.blogspot.com/2014/10/multiple-open-redirection.html http://mreagle0x.blogspot.com/2014/11/bypassing-facebook-linkshim-filtration.htm http://arulxtronix.blogspot.in/2013/08/facebook-open-url-redirectors-2013.html http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=975 http://yassineaboukir.com/blog/how-i-discovered-a-1000-open-redirect-in-faceboo

Clickjacking

http://codegrudge.blogspot.in/2015/03/how-i-got-5000-from-facebook-bugbounty.http://www.paulosyibelo.com/2015/03/facebook-bug-bounty-clickjacking.html

Object Reference (\$12500+)

http://www.anandprakash.pw/2014/11/hacking-facebookcomthanks-posting-on.htm http://blog.fin1te.net/post/53949849983/hijacking-a-facebook-account-with-sms http://arulxtronix.blogspot.in/2013/09/delete-any-photo-from-facebook-by.html http://www.dan-melamed.com/2013/06/hacking-any-facebook-account-exploit-posthtp://blog.fin1te.net/post/62263963253/removing-covers-images-on-friendship-pa

http://www.7xter.com/2015/02/how-i-hacked-your-facebook-photos.html

Privacy/Spam (\$1500+)

http://philippeharewood.com/ability-to-invite-any-user-to-a-facebook-page-all-non-http://sweethacking.blogspot.com/2014/11/how-i-made-500-usd-by-reporting-logic http://patorjk.com/blog/2013/03/01/facebook-user-identification-bug/https://www.facebook.com/notes/\$2500-lakhpati-bug-at-facebook-gaining-access-

of-a-closed-group/686615161373797
http://blog.internot.info/2014/05/facebook-skype-to-email-leak-3000-bounty.html

Port Scanning!

Port scanning is not just for Netpen!

A full port scan of all your new found targets will usually yield #win:

- separate webapps
- extraneous services
- Facebook had Jenkins Script console with no auth
- IIS.net had rdp open vulnerable to MS12_020

nmap -sS -A -PN -p- --script=http-title dontscanme.bro

^ syn scan, OS + service fingerprint, no ping, all ports, http titles

Dewhurst Security Blog

09 Dec 2014 on

How I hacked Facebook

Ok, ok. I didn't quite "hack Facebook". What I did was execute OS level commands on one of Facebook's acquisition's servers.

This is how I did it.

One day last September I was in bed with terrible flu. While I was bedridden I got bored and started to poke around Facebook's Bug Bounty program. I have participated in Bug Bounties before but never Facebook's.

This is by no means a complicated hack by the way, but it worked.

I started by port scanning Facebook's in scope domains with Nmap. Probed a few listening services on IPs that looked interesting.

Mapping

Mapping tips

- Google
- *Smart* Directory Brute Forcing
 - RAFT lists (included in <u>Seclists</u>)
 - SVN Digger (included in <u>Seclists</u>)
 - Git Digger
- Platform Identification:
 - Wapplyzer (Chrome)
 - <u>Builtwith</u> (Chrome)
 - retire.js (cmd-line or Burp)
 - Check CVE's
- Auxiliary
 - WPScan
 - CMSmap

```
xg33k@ruined-sec:/pentest/web/wpscan(master)$ ./wpscan.rb -u http://localh
   WordPress Security Scanner by the WPScan Team
Sponsored by the RandomStorm Open Source Initiative
 URL: http://localhost/wordpress/
 Started on Wed Apr 3 09:27:29 2013
   The WordPress 'http://localhost/wordpress/readme.html' file exists
   Full Path Disclosure (FPD) in 'http://localhost/wordpress/wp-includes/rs
   XML-RPC Interface available under http://localhost/wordpress/xmlrpc.php
   WordPress version 3.5.1 identified from meta generator
   The WordPress theme in use is brilliant v1.2.2
  Name: brilliant v1.2.2
  Location: http://localhost/wordpress/wp-content/themes/brilliant/
  Readme: http://localhost/wordpress/wp-content/themes/brilliant/readme.txt
   Enumerating plugins from passive detection ...
No plugins found :(
   Finished at Wed Apr 3 09:27:32 2013
   Elapsed time: 00:00:03
```

Directory Bruteforce Workflow

After bruteforcing look for other status codes indicating you are denied or require auth then append list there to test for misconfigured access control.

Example:

```
GET <a href="http://www.acme.com">http://www.acme.com</a> - 200
```

GET http://www.acme.com/backlog/ - 404

GET http://www.acme.com/controlpanel/ - 401 hmm.. ok

GET http://www.acme.com/controlpanel/[bruteforce here now]

Mapping/Vuln Discovery using OSINT



Find previous/existing problem:

- Xssed.com
- Reddit XSS /r/xss
- Punkspider
- XSS.CX
- xssposed.org
- twitter searching
- ++

Issues might already reported but use the flaw area and injection type to guide you to further injections or filter bypass.

New Project: Maps

New OSINT/Mapping project

- 250+ bounty programs
- Crawl
- DNS info + bruteforce
- Bounty metadata (links, rewards, scope)
- API -> Intrigue

http://github.com/bugcrowdlabs/maps

lp Address	Domain Name
205.251.215.20 54.84.193.45 205.251.215.174	cdh.oculus.com d39nlaid7cu5vo.cloudfront.net share.oculus.com static.oculus.com dow88joyjh2pw.cloudfront.net www.facebook.com edge=star-shv-81-sjc2.facebook.com www22.oculus.com star.cl0r.facebook.com
lp Addr Summary	rd": "www.yahoo.com", "scope": "include" }, rd": "vahoo.com". "scope": "include" }.
205.251.215.20 54.84.193.45 205.251.215.174 31.13.77.6	rd": "www.flickr.com", "scope": "include" }, rd": "flickr.com", "scope": "include" }, : "https://itunes.apple.com/app/yahoo!-mail/id577586159?mt=8", "sco : "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.yahoo.mobile.c
Found 9 subdoma	in(s) in 4 host(s). Getting NS records for moves-app.com
Ip Addressbile	Server Name tunes apple com/app/yahoal/id384158842?mt=8", "scope"
217.70.179.1 173.246.98.1 213.167.229.1	<pre>c.dns:gandi.net google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.yahoo.mobile.c a.dns:gandi.net google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.yahoo.mobile.c a.dns:gandi.net google.com/app/yahool=search/id3618716837mt=8", "s b.dns.gandi.net google.com/app/yahool=finance/id328412781?nt=8", "s</pre>
Getting subdoma	in for moves-app.com
Ip Address 	Domain Name lay google.com/store/app/details/idecom.vahoo.mobile.com/store/app/yahoo-news-atom/id/849823567mt=8 accounts.moves-app.com apps.moves-app.com apps.moves-app.com dev.moves-app.com dev.moves-app.com moves-app.com moves-app.com
Ip Addr Sumary 54.208.211.227 54.209.68.168	: "https://itunes.apple.com/app/yahoo!-sports/id286058814?mt=8", "s : "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.yahoo.mobile.c : "https://itunes.apple.com/app/yahoo!-fantasy-football/id328415391 rd" : "yahoo.net", "scope" : "exclude" },
54.83.54.159	rd" : "www.yahoo.net", "scope" : "exclude" }
Found 6 subdoma	in(s) in 3 host(s). Getting NS records for instagram.com
NahamSec:maps m Ip Address	acadmin\$ grep 'instagram\ facebook' Facebook.txt=OUT.txt Server Name
205.251.198.147	and int aven linetary (facebook ! Facebook tyt OUT tyt
Getting subdoma	in for instagram.com
Ip Address	Domain Name
31.13.77.10	api.instagram.com

```
"program name": "Yahoo",
"reward_type" : "Dollars",
"reward_low": "$50",
"reward high": "$15000",
"scope": [
  {"DnsRecord" : "www.vahoo.com". "scope" : "include" }.
  {"DnsRecord" : "yahoo.com", "scope" : "include" },
  {"DnsRecord" : "www.flickr.com", "scope" : "include" },
  {"DnsRecord" : "flickr.com", "scope" : "include" },
  {"Mobile" : "https://itunes.apple.com/app/vahoo!-mail/id577586159?mt=8". "scope" : "include" }.
  {"Mobile" : "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.yahoo.mobile.client.android.mail&referrer=utm_source%3Dmobile.yahoo.com%26utm_medium%3Ddetailpagelink
  {"Mobile" : "https://itunes.apple.com/app/yahoo!-weather/id628677149?mt=8", "scope" : "include" },
  {"Mobile" : "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.yahoo.mobile.client.android.weather&referrer=utm_source%3Dmobile.yahoo.com%26utm_medium%3Ddetailpagel
  {"Mobile" : "https://itunes.apple.com/app/yahoo!/id304158842?mt=8", "scope" : "include" },
  {"Mobile" : "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.yahoo.mobile.client.android.yahoo&referrer=utm_source%3Dmobile.yahoo.com%26utm_medium%3Ddetailpagelin
  {"Mobile" : "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.vahoo.mobile.client.android.search&referrer=utm source%3Dmobile.yahoo.com%26utm medium%3Ddetailpageli
  {"Mobile" : "https://itunes.apple.com/app/vahoo!-search/id361071600?mt=8", "scope" : "include" },
  {"Mobile" : "https://itunes.apple.com/app/yahoo!-finance/id328412701?mt=8", "scope" : "include" },
  {"Mobile" : "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.yahoo.mobile.client.android.finance&hl=en&referrer=utm_source%3Dmobile.vahoo.com%26utm_medium%3Ddetai
  {"Mobile" : "https://itunes.apple.com/app/flickr/id328407587?mt=8", "scope" : "include" },
  {"Mobile" : "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.vahoo.mobile.client.android.flickr&referrer=utm_source%3Dmobile.vahoo.com%26utm_medium%3Ddetailpageli
  {"Mobile" : "https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/vahoo-news-atom/id784982356?mt=8". "scope" : "include" }.
  {"Mobile" : "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.yahoo.mobile.client.android.atom&referrer=utm_source%3Dmobile.vahoo.com%26utm medium%3Ddetailpagelink
  {"Mobile" : "https://itunes.apple.com/app/yahoo-screen/id694865999?mt=8", "scope" : "include" },
  {"Mobile" : "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.vahoo.mobile.client.android.screen&referrer=utm_source%3Dmobile.vahoo.com%26utm_medium%3Ddetailpageli
  {"Mobile" : "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.tul.aviate&referrer=utm source%3Dmobile.vahoo.com%26utm medium%3Ddetailpagelink". "scope" : "include"
  {"Mobile" : "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.protrade.sportacular&referrer=utm_source%3Dmobile.yahoo.com%26utm_medium%3Ddetailpagelink", "scope" :
  {"Mobile" : "https://itunes.apple.com/app/yahoo!-sports/id286058814?mt=8", "scope" : "include" },
  {"Mobile" : "https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.vahoo.mobile.client.android.fantasyfootball&referrer=utm_source%3Dmobile.vahoo.com%26utm_medium%3Ddet
  {"Mobile" : "https://itunes.apple.com/app/vahoo!-fantasv-football/id328415391?mt=8". "scope" : "include" }.
  {"DnsRecord" : "yahoo.net", "scope" : "exclude" },
  {"DnsRecord" : "www.yahoo.net", "scope" : "exclude" }
```

Using the Maps Project: Crawling

```
Using + Ruby + Anemone + JSON + Grep
```

\$cat test_target_json.txt | grep redirect

```
https://test_target/redirect/?url=http://twitter.com/...
https://test_target/redirect/?url=http://facebook.com/...
https://test_target/redirect/?url=http://pinterest.com/...
```

New Tool: Intrigue

OSINT framework, simple to integrate. Features like:

- DNS Subdomain Brute force
- Web Spider
- Nmap Scan
- etc

Code @ http://github.com/intrigueio/intrigue-core

Check Confluence Check Github Check Okta Check Onelogin Check Project Honeypot Convert Entity **DNS Cache Snoop** DNS Forward Lookup DNS MX Lookup **DNS Reverse Lookup DNS Service Record Bruteforce** DNS Subdomain Bruteforce DNS TLD Bruteforce DNS TXT Lookup **DNS Zone Transfer Email Harvester** Example Fuzz a NetSvc with random data Geolocate Host IP Address to AS Number Masscan Scan Nmap Scan Search Bing Search EDGAR Search Google Search Pipl Search Shodan Twitter Gather Friends URI Check Safebrowsing Api **URI Check Security Headers URI Dirbuster URI Gather And Analyze Links URI Gather Headers URI** Gather Metadata **URI Gather SSL Certificate URI Gather Technology** URI Screenshot

URI Spider

..

20:46:12 worker.1 | [] : Sending to Webhook: http://localhost:7777/v1/task_runs/4a117a10-3d06-4c82-aee7-cb5eb08ca973

TaskRun: dns_brute_sub

```
ID: aa921c00-689c-4cb1-96e8-e059f4ae3384
Start: 2015-07-14 03:22:31 UTC
End: 2015-07-14 03:25:50 UTC
Elapsed (s): 199
Entity: {"type"=>"DnsRecord", "attributes"=>{"name"=>"intrigue.io"}}
New Entities:
· DnsRecord: api.intrigue.io
   ({"type"=>"DnsRecord", "attributes"=>{"name"=>"api.intrigue.io"}})

    IpAddress: 72.14.190.138

   ({"type"=>"IpAddress", "attributes"=>{"name"=>"72.14.190.138"}})

    DnsRecord: blog.intrigue.io

   ({"type"=>"DnsRecord", "attributes"=>{"name"=>"blog.intrigue.io"}})

    IpAddress: 192.0.78.13

   ({"type"=>"IpAddress", "attributes"=>{"name"=>"192.0.78.13"}})
· DnsRecord: calendar.intrigue.io
   ({"type"=>"DnsRecord", "attributes"=>{"name"=>"calendar.intrique.io"}})

    IpAddress: 74.125.25.121

   ({"type"=>"IpAddress", "attributes"=>{"name"=>"74.125.25.121"}})
· DnsRecord: core.intrique.io
   ({"type"=>"DnsRecord", "attributes"=>{"name"=>"core.intrigue.io"}})

    DnsRecord: docs.intrigue.io

   ({"type"=>"DnsRecord", "attributes"=>{"name"=>"docs.intrigue.io"}})

    IpAddress: 74.125.28.121

   ({"type"=>"IpAddress", "attributes"=>{"name"=>"74.125.28.121"}})
· DnsRecord: email.intrigue.io
   ({"type"=>"DnsRecord", "attributes"=>{"name"=>"email.intrigue.io"}})

    IpAddress: 50.56.21.178

   ({"type"=>"IpAddress", "attributes"=>{"name"=>"50.56.21.178"}})

    DnsRecord: mail.intrique.io

   ({"type"=>"DnsRecord", "attributes"=>{"name"=>"mail.intrigue.io"}})

    DnsRecord: sites.intrigue.io

   ({"type"=>"DnsRecord", "attributes"=>{"name"=>"sites.intrique.io"}})

    IpAddress: 74.125.129.121
```

Auth and Session

Auth (better be quick)

Auth Related (more in logic, priv, and transport sections)


- User/pass discrepancy flaw
- Registration page harvesting
- Login page harvesting
- Password reset page harvesting
- No account lockout
- Weak password policy
- Password not required for account updates
- Password reset tokens (no expiry or re-use)



Session (better be quick)

Session Related

- Failure to invalidate old cookies
- No new cookies on login/logout/timeout
- Never ending cookie length
- Multiple sessions allowed
- Easily reversible cookie (base64 most often)



Tactical Fuzzing - XSS

Core Idea: **Does the page functionality display something to the users?**

For time sensitive testing the 80/20 rule applies. Many testers use **Polyglot** payloads. You probably have too!



```
';alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//';alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//";alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//--
></SCRIPT>">'><SCRIPT>alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))/
</SCRIPT>
```

Multi-context, filter bypass based polyglot payload #1 (Rsnake XSS Cheat Sheet)

```
">><marquee><imq src=x onerror=confirm(1)></marquee>"
   ></plaintext\></|\><plaintext/onmouseover=prompt(1)
      ><script>prompt(1)</script>@gmail.com<isindex
    formaction=javascript:alert(/XSS/) type=submit>'-->"
></script><script>alert(1)</script>"><img/id="confirm&lpar;
1)"/alt="/"src="/"onerror=eval(id&%23x29;>'"><img src="http:
                //i.imgur.com/P8mL8.jpg">
```

Multi-context, filter bypass based polyglot payload #2 (Ashar Javed XSS Research)

"onclick=alert(1)//<button onclick=alert(1)//> */ alert(1)//

Multi-context polyglot payload (Mathias Karlsson)

Other XSS Observations

<u>Input Vectors</u>			
Customizable Themes & Profiles via CSS			
Event or meeting names			
URI based			
Imported from a 3rd party (think Facebook integration)			
JSON POST Values (check returning content type)			
File Upload names			
Uploaded files (swf, HTML, ++)			
Custom Error pages			
fake params - ?realparam=1&foo=bar'+alert(/XSS/)+'			
Login and Forgot password forms			

SWF Parameter XSS

Common Params:

Common Params:

onload, allowedDomain, movieplayer, xmlPath, eventhandler, callback (more on OWASP page)

Common Injection Strings:

\%22})))}catch(e){alert(document.domain);}//

"]);}catch(e){}if(!self.a)self.a=!alert(document.domain);//


"a")(({type:"ready"}));}catch(e){alert(1)}//

SWF Parameter XSS

Hello, world!

Welcome to project "Flashbang". This tool is an open-source Flash-security helper with a very specific purpose: Find the flashVars of a naked SWF and display them so a security tester can start hacking away without decompiling the code. For fun, try this vulnerable old version of swfupload in flashbang

Open SWF!



Tactical Fuzzing - SQLi

SQL Injection

Core Idea: Does the page look like it might need to call on stored data?

There exist some SQLi polyglots, i.e;


SLEEP(1) /*' or SLEEP(1) or '" or SLEEP(1) or "*/

Works in single quote context, works in double quote context, works in "straight into query" context! (Mathias Karlsson)

SQL Injection

You can also leverage the large database of fuzzlists from <u>Seclists</u> here:





SQL Injection Observations

Blind is predominant, Error based is highly unlikely.

'%2Bbenchmark(3200,SHA1(1))%2B'
'+BENCHMARK(4000000,SHA1(1337))+'


SQLMap is king!


- Use -l to parse a Burp log file.
- Use Tamper Scripts for blacklists.
- <u>SQLiPy</u> Burp plugin works well to instrument SQLmap quickly.

Lots of injection in web services!

Common Parameters or Injection points
ID
Currency Values
Item number values
sorting parameters (i.e order, sort, etc)
JSON and XML values
Cookie values (really?)
Custom headers (look for possible integrations with CDN's or WAF's)
REST based Services

SQLmap SQLiPy





Best SQL injection resources


	DBMS Specific Resources
mySQL	PentestMonkey's mySQL injection cheat sheet Reiners mySQL injection Filter Evasion Cheatsheet
MSSQL	EvilSQL's Error/Union/Blind MSSQL Cheatsheet PentestMonkey's MSSQL SQLi injection Cheat Sheet
ORACLE	PentestMonkey's Oracle SQLi Cheatsheet
POSTGRESQL	PentestMonkey's Postgres SQLi Cheatsheet
Others	Access SQLi Cheatsheet PentestMonkey's Ingres SQL Injection Cheat Sheet pentestmonkey's DB2 SQL Injection Cheat Sheet pentestmonkey's Informix SQL Injection Cheat Sheet SQLite3 Injection Cheat sheet Ruby on Rails (Active Record) SQL Injection Guide

Tactical Fuzzing - FI & Uploads

Local file inclusion

Core Idea: Does it (or can it) interact with the server file system?

<u>Liffy</u> is new and cool here but you can also use <u>Seclists</u>:



Common Parameters or Injection points
file=
location=
locale=
path=
display=
load=
read=
retrieve=

Malicious File Upload ++

This is an important and common attack vector in this type of testing

A file upload functions need a lot of protections to be adequately secure.

Attacks:

- Upload unexpected file format to achieve code exec (swf, html, php, php3, aspx, ++) Web shells or...
- Execute XSS via same types of files. Images as well!
- Attack the parser to DoS the site or XSS via storing payloads in metadata or file header
- Bypass security zones and store malware on target site via file polyglots

Malicious File Upload ++

File upload attacks are a whole presentation. Try this one to get a feel for bypass techniques:

- content type spoofing
- extension trickery
- File in the hole! presentaion http://goo.gl/VCXPh6



Malicious File Upload ++

As referenced file polyglots can be used to store malware on servers!

See @dan_crowley 's talk: http://goo.gl/pquXC2

and @angealbertini research: <u>corkami.</u> <u>com</u>

Binary files

- 2014/09/08 PoC a PDFLaTeX quine+polyglot: A PDF that is also
- 2014/08/10 PoC PoC||GTFO 0x5 a Flash, Iso, PDF, ZIP polyglots
 article A cryptographer and a binarista walk into a bar
- 2014/06/27 PoC PoC||GTFO 0x4 a TrueCrypt, PDF , ZIP polyglot
 - This Encrypted Volume is also a PDF; or, A Polyglot Trick for I
 - How to Manually Attach a File to a PDF
- 2014/04/02 When your slides read themselves: a binary inception
- 2014/03/30 a JPG/ZIP/PDF binary chimera (the file is a JPG image the image data is present only once) 1 data body, 3 heads of diff
- (2014/03/17) Poc||GTFO 0x03 is a PDF/ZIP/JPG/Audio (raw AFS
 - This PDF is a JPEG; or, This Proof of Concept is a Picture of (
 - A Binary Magic Trick, Angecryption
- (2013/12/28) a MBR/PDF/ZIP polyglot + article
- (2013/10/06) a schizophrenic PE + article
- (2013/09/13) 'inception' slides a PE+PDF+HTML+ZIP polyglot ar
- (2013/01/02) CorkaM-OsX, a Mach-O+PDF+HTML+Java polyglo
- (2012/12/13) CorkaMlnuX, an ELF+PDF+HTML+Java polyglot fil
- (2012/08/01) CorkaMIX, a PE+PDF+HTML(+JavaScript)+(Jar[Cla

Remote file includes and redirects

Look for any param with another web address in it. Same params from LFI can present here too.

Common blacklist bypasses:

- escape "/" with "\/" or "//" with "\\/"
- try single "/" instead of "//"
- remove http i.e. "continue=//google.com"
- "/\\", "|/", "/%09/"
- encode, slashes
- "./" CHANGE TO "..//"
- "../" CHANGE TO "....//"
- "/" CHANGE TO "//"


Redirections Common Parameters or Injection points
dest=
continue=
redirect=
url= (or anything with "url" in it)
uri= (same as above)
window=
next=

Remote file includes and redirects

RFI Common Parameters or Injection points						
File=	document=					
Folder=	root=					
Path=	pg=					
style=	pdf=					
template=						
php_path=						
doc=						

Everyone knows CSRF but the TLDR here is find sensitive functions and attempt to CSRF.

Burps CSRF PoC is fast and easy for this:



Many sites will have CSRF protection, focus on CSRF bypass!

Common bypasses:

- Remove CSRF token from request
- Remove CSRF token parameter value
- Add bad control chars to CSRF parameter value
- Use a second identical CSRF param
- Change POST to GET

Check this out...

Debasish Mandal wrote a python tool to automate finding CSRF bypasses called <u>Burpy</u>.

Step 1: Enable logging in Burp. Crawl a site with Burp completely executing all functions.

Step 2: Create a template...

p burpy / modules / samplexsrf.py

production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | production | pr





debasishm89 on Oct 30, 2013 Update samplexsrf.py

1 contributor

```
20 lines (19 sloc) | 1.069 kb
                                                                                                          Blame
                                                                                                                   History
                                                                                                   Raw
       from rawweb import *
       def main(raw stream,ssl):
                                                              # create a mail subroutine (mandatory)
               title = ["Possible XSRF",
                                                        #Test title for reporting when test is successful
                             "Removed XSRF token from request"]# Brief description of test how you are manipulating the request(Will help
   4
                                                              # Initiate rawweb library
               raw = RawWeb(raw stream)
   5
               raw.addheaders({'Header1':'Value1'}) # Add new headers to that request
   6
               raw.removeheaders(['Referrer'])
                                                 # Remove Referrer header if exist in raw request
               final = raw.removeparameter("auth token")  # final will hold the final request to be fired.(For reporting)
   8
               result = raw.fire(ssl)
   9
               #result[0] => 200 => Integer
  10
               #result[1] => OK => String
  11
               #result[2] => Response headers => dictionary
  12
               #result[3] => body
                                      => string
  13
               if 'csrf error' in result[3]:
  14
                       # Generic CSRF error is in response body. Hence return "FALSE"
  15
                       return "FALSE"
  16
               else:
  17
                       # As the generic csrf error is not present in body, treat this as suspicious and +ve result.
  18
                       return title,final,result[0],result[1],result[2],result[3]
  19
```

Base Request

POST /messages/action/ HTTP/1.1

Host: www.facebook.com

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/20.0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Referer: http://www.facebook.com/messagingconfirmation?action_url=/messages/action/?

mm_action=delete&tids=mid.1375723992343%3A9fb37a810424df2016&tid=mid.1375723992343:9fb37a81

Cookie: Deleted

Connection: keep-alive

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-Length: 61

mm_action=delete&tids=mid.1375723992343:9fb37a810424df2016&fb_dtsg=xy8asd_

Crafted Request [Token Removed from Request]

POST /messages/action/ HTTP/1.1

Content-Length: 61

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Connection: keep-alive

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/20.0

Host: www.facebook.com

Referer: http://www.facebook.com/messagingconfirmation?action_url=/messages/action/?

mm_action=delete&tids=mid.1375723992343%3A9fb37a810424df201&tid=mid.1375723992343:9fb37a810

Fun: Fun

Cookie: Deleted

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

mm_action=delete&tids=mid.1375723992343:9fb37a810424df2016&

Live Response

HTTP/1.1 408 Client timeout

date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 07:54:30 GMT

connection: keep-alive

content-type: text/html; charset=utf-8

content-length: 2131

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1

Or focus on pages without the token in Burp:

<u>https://github.</u>
<u>com/arvinddoraiswamy/mywebappscripts/blob/master/BurpExtensions/csrf_token_d</u>
<u>etect.py</u>

#This is where you put the name of the token that is being used in the application you are testing. It searches for __VIEWSTATE by default #extension will search for this token in every request and tell you which requests do NOT have a token, so you can manually explore. anticsrf_token_name='securityRequestParameter'

CSRF Common Critical functions							
Add / Upload file	Password change						
Email change	Transfer Money / Currency						
Delete File	Profile edit						




Privilege, Transport, Logic

Privilege

Often logic, priv, auth bugs are blurred.

Testing user priv:

- admin has power
- 2. peon has none
- 3. peon can use function only meant for admin



Privilege

- Find site functionality that is restricted to certain user types
- Try accessing those functions with lesser/other user roles
- 3. Try to directly browse to views with sensitive information as a lesser priv user

Autorize Burp plugin is pretty neat here...

https://github.com/Quitten/Autorize

Common Functions or Views
Add user function
Delete user function
start project / campaign / etc function
change account info (pass, CC, etc) function
customer analytics view
payment processing view
any view with PII

- Browse using high priv user
- Login with a lower priv user
- Burp Plugin re-requests to see if low priv can access high priv

	Burp Intru	ıder Rep	oeater W	indow Help)									
	Target	Proxy	Spider	Scanner	Intruder	Repeater	Sequencer	Decoder	Comparer	Extender	Options	Alerts	Autorize	
	URL													Authorization Enforcement Status
https://github.com:443/Quitten/Autorize Authorization 6						Authorization enforced??? (please								
	https://gith	nub.com	443/Quitte	n/Autorize										Authorization enforced::: (please)

https://collector.githubapp.com.443/github/page_view.idimensions(page)=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2FQuitten%2FAutorize&dimensions(title)=Q.

- Authorization enforced ??? (please configure e https://github.com.443/Quitten/Autorize/show_partial:partial=recently_touched_branches_list
- https://github.com:443/Quitten/Autorize/issues/counts Authorization bypass: https://github.com:443/_sockets Authorization enforced ??? (please configure e
- https://www.google-analytics.com:443/collect Authorization bypass: https://www.google-analytics.com.443/collect;v=1&_v=j30&a=390061675&t=pageview&_s=1&dl=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2FQuitten%2FAutori... Authorization bypass: https;//collector.githubapp.com:443/github/page_view!dimensions[page]=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2FQuitten%2FAutorize&dimensions[title]=Q. Authorization bypass:

e configure e e configure e

Authorization bypass:

- https://github.com:443/_stats Authorization bypass: https://fbcdn-video-d-a.akamaihd.net.443/hvideo-ak-xpa1/v/t42.1790-2/10950765_10155225512495112_67071319_n.mp4\ri=549&vabr=305&oh=726ae3fd5 Authorization bypass: https://github.com:443/Quitten/Autorize Authorization enforced:
- https://github.com/443/Quitten/Autorize/show_partial=recently_touched_branches_list Authorization enforced: ?? (please configure e https://github.com:443/Quitten/Autorize/issues/counts Authorization bypass:
- https://github.com:443/_sockets Authorization enforced: ?? (please configure e https://www.google-analytics.com/443/collect Authorization bypass:
- https://www.google-analytics.com;443/collect;v=1&_v=j30&a=1052251930&t=pageview&_s=1&dl=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2FQuitten%2FAuto. Authorization bypass: https://0-edge-chat.facebook.com.443/pull/channel=p_1164700792&seg=7&partition=-2&clientid=418e75d7&cb=fzom&idle=6&cap=8&uid=1164700792& Authorization enforced:

Insecure direct object references

IDORs are common place in bounties, and hard to catch with scanners.


Find any and all UIDs


- increment
- decrement
- negative values
- Attempt to perform sensitive functions substituting another UID
 - change password
 - forgot password
 - admin only functions



Idor's

Common Functions , Views, or Files
Everything from the CSRF Table, trying cross account attacks
Sub: UIDs, user hashes, or emails
Images that are non-public
Receipts
Private Files (pdfs, ++)
Shipping info & Purchase Orders
Sending / Deleting messages





Transport

Most security concerned sites will enable HTTPs. It's your job to ensure they've done it **EVERYWHERE**. Most of the time they miss something.

Examples:

- Sensitive images transported over HTTP
- Analytics with session data / PII leaked over HTTP



Transport


https://github.com/arvinddoraiswamy/mywebappscripts/tree/master/ForceSSL

- 1. Spider the application and generate a site map in Burp.
- 2. Select the sites/directories that you want using CTRL+Click; right click in Burp and select 'Copy all URLs'.
- 3. Create a new file called https_urls in the same directory as this script.
- 4. Paste the copied URLs into this file and save this file.
- 5. Run the script force http req threaded.py as follows python force http req threaded.py.
- 6. Create a directory called URLs. The file 'https_urls' is copied into URLs and split into multiple files; each having 200 lines
- 7. Each file is processed and every single https URL now requested over HTTP.
- 8. The result of this process is written into a file called 'report'. This file is in the same directory as the script.

Logic

Logic flaws that are tricky, mostly manual:

- substituting hashed parameters
- step manipulation
- use negatives in quantities
- authentication bypass
- application level DoS
- Timing attacks



Mobile


Data Storage

Its common to see mobile apps not applying encryption to the files that store PII.

Common places to find PII unencrypted
Phone system logs (avail to all apps)
webkit cache (cache.db)
plists, dbs, etc
hardcoded in the binary

Quick spin-up for iOS

Daniel Mayers idb tool:



Logs!

```
root@generic_x86:/ # logcat
logcat
          beginning of /dev/log/system
D/ConnectivityService( 1272): Sampling interval elapsed, updating statistics ..
D/ConnectivityService( 1272): Done.
D/ConnectivityService( 1272): Setting timer for 720seconds
          ( 4416): entered password is pass - Login Failed
E-CoundPool( 1272): error loading /system/media/aadio/ai/Effect_Tick.ogg
W/AudioService( 1272): Soundpool could not load file: /system/media/audio/ui/Effect_Tick.ogg
E/SoundPool( 1272): error loading /system/media/audio/ui/Effect_Tick.ogg
W/AudioService( 1272): Soundpool could not load file: /system/media/audio/ui/Effect_Tick.ogg
E/SoundPool( 1272): error loading /system/media/audio/ui/Effect_Tick.ogg
M/AudioService( 1272): Soundpool could not load file: /system/media/audio/ui/Effect_Tick.ogg
E/SoundPool( 1272): error loading /system/media/audio/ui/Effect_Tick.ogg
M/AudioService( 1272): Soundpool could not load file: /system/media/audio/ui/Effect_Tick.ogg
E/SoundPool( 1272): error loading /system/media/audio/ui/Effect_Tick.ogg
M/AudioService( 1272): Soundpool could not load file: /system/media/audio/ui/Effect Tick.ogg
E/SoundPool( 1272): error loading /system/media/audio/ui/K<u>eypressStandard.ogg</u>
M/AudioService( 1272): Soundpool could not load file: /system/media/audio/ui/KeypressStandard.ogg
E/SoundPool( 1272): error loading /system/media/audio/ui/KeypressSpacebar.ogg
M/AudioService( 1272): Soundpool could not load file: /system/media/audio/ui/KeypressSpacebar.ogg
E/SoundPool( 1272): error loading /system/media/audio/ui/KeypressDelete.ogg
M/AudioService( 1272): Soundpool could not load file: /system/media/audio/ui/KeypressDelete.ogg
E/SoundPool( 1272): error loading /system/media/audio/ui/KeypressReturn.ogg
W/AudioService( 1272): Soundpool could not load file: /system/media/audio/ui/KeypressReturn.ogg
E/SoundPool( 1272): error loading /system/media/audio/ui/KeypressInvalid.ogg
/AudioService( 1272): Soundpool could not load file: /system/media/audio/ui/KeypressInvalid.ogg
W/hadioService( 1272). onLoadSoundEffects(), Error i while loading samples
I/LOGIN ( 4416): entered password is password - Successful Attempt
E-BoundPool( 1272): error loading /system/nedia/aadio/ai/Effect_Tick.ogg
M/AudioService( 1272): Soundpool could not load file: /system/media/audio/ui/Effect_Tick.ogg
E/SoundPool( 1272): error loading /system/media/audio/ui/Effect_Tick.ogg
M/AudioService( 1272): Soundpool could not load file: /system/media/audio/ui/Effect_Tick.ogg
E/SoundPool( 1272): error loading /system/media/audio/ui/Effect_Tick.ogg
M/AudioService( 1272): Soundpool could not load file: /system/media/audio/ui/Effect_Tick.ogg
E/SoundPool( 1272): error loading /system/media/audio/ui/Effect_Tick.ogg
M/AudioService( 1272): Soundpool could not load file: /system/media/audio/ui/Effect Tick.ogg
E/SoundPool( 1272): error loading /system/media/audio/ui/Effect_Tick.ogg
M/AudioService( 1272): Soundpool could not load file: /system/media/audio/ui/Effect_Tick.ogg
I/ActivityManager( 1272): START u0 (cmp=com.isi.testapp/.Welcome) from pid 4416.
```


Auxiliary

The vulns formerly known as "noise"


- Content Spoofing or HTML injection
- Referer leakage
- security headers
- path disclosure
- clickjacking
- ++



How to test a web app in *n* minutes



How can you get maximum results within a given time window?



Data Driven Assessment (diminishing return FTW)



- 1. Visit the search, registration, contact, password reset, and comment forms and hit them with your polyglot strings
- 2. Scan those specific functions with Burp's built-in scanner
- 3. Check your cookie, log out, check cookie, log in, check cookie. Submit old cookie, see if access.
- Perform user enumeration checks on login, registration, and password reset.
- 5. Do a reset and see if; the password comes plaintext, uses a URL based token, is predictable, can be used multiple times, or logs you in automatically
- Find numeric account identifiers anywhere in URLs and rotate them for context change
- 7. Find the security-sensitive function(s) or files and see if vulnerable to non-auth browsing (idors), lower-auth browsing, CSRF, CSRF protection bypass, and see if they can be done over HTTP.
- 8. Directory brute for top short list on SecLists
- Check upload functions for alternate file types that can execute code (xss or php/etc/etc)

Things to take with you...

- 1. Crowdsourced testing is different enough to pay attention to
- 2. Crowdsourcing focuses on the 20% because the 80% goes quick
- 3. Data analysis can yield the most successfully attacked areas
- 4. A 15 minute web test, done right, could yield a majority of your critical vulns
- 5. Add polyglots to your toolbelt
- 6. Use SecLists to power your scanners
- Remember to periodically refresh your game with the wisdom of other techniques and other approaches

Follow these ninjas who I profiled: https://twitter.com/Jhaddix/lists/bninjas

Gitbook project: The Bug Hunters Methodology

This preso ended up to be way too much to fit in an 45min talk so... we turned it into a Git project! (if you are reading this from the Defcon DVD check my <u>twitter</u> or <u>Github</u> for linkage)

- 50% of research still unparsed
- More tooling to automate
- XXE and parser attacks
- SSRF
- Captcha bypass
- Detailed logic flaws
- More mobile

Meme Count:

13

Attribution and Thanks

Tim Tomes - Recon-ng

Joe Giron - RFI params

Soroush Dalili - File in the Hole preso

Mathias Karlsson - polyglot research

Ashar Javed - polyglot/xss research

Ryan Dewhurst & Wpscan Team

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