




# Fixing CSRF Effectively

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


# CSRF – Cross Site Request Forgery






# CSRF – Cross Site Request Forgery






# CSRF – Cross Site Request Forgery




# + CSRF




- The malicious request is not made the user, but the server does not know this, thinks that it is made by the user, and happily services the request.

# + Two Conditions






# Trigger Request



- Attacker sends fishing email
- Attacker posts the request to other sites
- Using scripts
  - Many automation and programming tricks


# + Good User Behavior



- Logoff immediately after using a Web application
- Do NOT allow your browser to save username/passwords
- Do NOT allow site to remember your login
- Do NOT use the same browser to access sensitive applications and surf the Internet freely
- Use No-Script like plugins to prevent scripts from submitting POST requests automatically


from OWASP






**Can a Web site count on  
good user behaviors?**

# + Why Can CSRF Happen



# + Open Web




+ Open Web


**Amazing**




# + Open Web - **CSRF**




# + Open Web – No CSRF







# Browser Features




- HTTP Headers

- Origin
- Referer





# Browser Features



- HTTP Headers
  - Origin
  - Referer
- Content Security Policy (CSP)

# + The Referrer Header

## Referrer Policy 📄 - WD

Global

64.29%

Allow control of HTTP referrers via the referrer meta tag.

Current aligned

Usage relative

Show all

IE	Edge	Firefox	Chrome	Safari	Opera	iOS Safari *	Opera Mini *	Android Browser *	Chrome for Android
8			31					4.1	
9		38	43					4.3	
10		39	44			7.1		4.4.4	
11	12	40	45	8	31	8.4	8	44	44
	13	41	46	9	32	9			
		42	47		33				
		43	48						

# + The Origin Header

## Cross-Origin Resource Sharing - REC

Global

83.47% + 8.55% = 92.03%

Method of performing XMLHttpRequests across domains

Current aligned Usage relative Show all

IE	Edge	Firefox	Chrome	Safari	Opera	iOS Safari *	Opera Mini *	Android Browser *	Chrome for Android
<div>2</div> 8			31					<div>1</div> 4.1	
<div>2</div> 9		38	43					<div>1</div> 4.3	
<div>1</div> 10		39	44			<div>3</div> 7.1		4.4.4	
11	12	40	45	<div>3</div> 8	31	<div>3</div> 8.4	8	44	44
	13	41	46	<div>3</div> 9	32	<div>3</div> 9			
		42	47		33				
		43	48						

## Content Security Policy 1.0 - CR

Global

76.33% + 8.32% = 84.64%

Mitigate cross-site scripting attacks by whitelisting allowed sources of script, style, and other resources.

Current aligned

Usage relative

Show all

IE	Edge	Firefox	Chrome	Safari	Opera	iOS Safari *	Opera Mini *	Android Browser *	Chrome for Android
8			31					4.1	
9		38	43					4.3	
10		39	44			7.1		4.4.4	
11	12	40	45	8	31	8.4	8	44	44
	13	41	46	9	32	9			
		42	47		33				
		43	48						

# + Using the Origin Header

- An API for a service handler to call



```
void verifyOriginHeader(HttpServletRequest request);
```

- Implementation

- Whitelist accepting domains
- As a SaaS provider, allow customers to set the whitelist via configuration file or database query



# Pareto Empirical Principle: 80 - 20






# Server Side – Central Question

Server needs to know if a request comes from itself

<https://banking.gb.com/payment?amount=4&from=c&to=s>






# Solution: Cryptographic Secret

- Use a cryptographic secret to identify its own URLs  
CSRF Token/Nonce

`https://banking.gb.com/payment?  
amount=9999&from=c&to=s&csrf=0123456789abcdef01234567  
89abcdef`







# Solution: Cryptographic Secret

- Use a cryptographic secret to identify its own URLs  
CSRF Token/Nonce

```
<form method="POST" action="...&csrf=xxx">...</form>
```

```
<input type="hidden" name="csrf" value="xxx">
```






# Solution: Cryptographic Secret

- Request handler validates CSRF tokens

```
void verifyCSRFToken(HttpServletRequest request);
```





# CSRF Token Management



- Cryptographically strong
  - 256 bits, `java.security.SecureRandom`
- Rotation: creation and expiration
  - Create a new token for each new request
  - FIFO queue, Least recently used, ...
- Internal APIs hidden from Web application
  - Only used by CSRF APIs




# CSRF APIs



- Tag a request with a CSRF token
  - `String stampURL(String url);`
  - `FormGenerator stampURL(FormGenerator form);`
  - `String getToken();`
- Check the token
  - `void verifyCSRFToken(HttpServletRequest request);`

# + POST vs. GET




## ■ GET

- cached, logged, etc.
- more exposure than a form hidden field
- RFC 2616 recommends as a *safe* method
- related to token secret management

## ■ POST


# + Server vs. Client Store



- Server stores CSRF tokens in user's session
- Client stores CSRF tokens in cookie  
aka. double submit cookies



# Error Handling




- Return error page
- Return a page educating user about CSRF
- Internal logging



# CSRF Boundary

- Not want to check requests for public landing pages








# CSRF Boundary


- Cut yourself out of the Web






# Draw a CSRF Boundary in URLs

The most difficult task in protecting a legacy web site





# Draw a CSRF Boundary in URLs



## ■ Lesson

Distinguish public resources and non-public resources before screwed up



**Thank You!**