



RESPONSIBLE

CYBER


# Behind LockerGoga – A walk through a ransomware attack worth 40m\$

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## MY CAREER SO FAR ....



Failing modelling career  
/ Ongoing PhD



IT/Security Consultant  
& Trainer



Chief Information Security  
Officer On Demand



CyberFeminist Hacker  
& Influencer  
(A lot of photoshop...)

Special Thanks to **Rik Ferguson, VP Security Research at Trend Micro**

And below public contributors to ransomware research:

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## Encrypting Ransomware

Incorporated with advanced encryption algorithms, this type of ransomware is designed to block system files and demand payment to provide the affected user with the key that will decrypt the blocked content. For example: Crypto Locker, Wannacry, Locky, CryptoWall, etc.



## Locker Ransomware

This malware locks the person out of the OS, making it impossible for them to access the data saved on it. Here, the files are not encrypted, but the ransomware still asks for a ransom to unlock the infected device. For example: Police-themed ransomware or Win locker.



## MBR Ransomware

Master Boot Record (MBR) ransomware is a type of Locker ransomware. The MBR is a section of a hard drive that enables the Operating System to boot up. However, when the MBR ransomware attacks the drive, the boot process fails to complete and demands the payment of ransom as soon as possible. For example: Satana, Petya, etc.

Source: <https://secure.wphackedhelp.com/blog/b0r0nt0k-ransomware/>





Riviera Beach

**US\$600,000**

May 29



Lake City

**US\$460,000**

June 10



Key Biscayne

No reported payment

June 23

**77%** ↑

Overall ransomware detections  
compared to the second half of 2018

**55%** ↓

New ransomware families compared to  
the second half of 2018

## **Ryuk**

- Arrives via spam
- Can render infected systems unbootable

## **LockerGoga**

- Arrives via compromised credentials
- Modifies the passwords of infected systems' user accounts, prevents infected systems from being rebooted

## **RobbinHood**

- Arrives via unsecure remote desktops or trojans
- Encrypts each file with a unique key

## **BitPaymer**

- Arrives via compromised accounts and emails containing Dridex
- Abuses PsExec tool

## **MegaCortex**

- Arrives via compromised controllers
- Disables certain processes

## **Nozelesn**

- Arrives via spam
- Its trojan downloader, Nymaim, uses fileless techniques to load the ransomware.

Companies do not patch ...

Employees click on phishing  
links ...





## Type of Ransomware – What companies do ... if they do ...

|                        | Extensions                   | Extension Pattern   | Ransom Note Filename(s)       | Comment             | Encryption Algorithm |
|------------------------|------------------------------|---|-------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| <b>.CryptoHasYou.</b>  | .enc                         |   | YOUR_FILES_ARE_LOCKED.txt     |                     | AES(256)             |
| <b>777</b>             | .777                         | ._[timestamp]_[email]\$.777<br>e.g. ._14-05-2016-11-59-36_\$.ninja.gaiver@aol.com\$.777 | read_this_file.txt            |                     | XOR                  |
| <b>7ev3n</b>           | .R4A<br>.R5A                 |   | FILES_BACK.txt                |                     |                      |
| <b>7h9r</b>            | .7h9r                        |   | README_.TXT                   |                     | AES                  |
| <b>8lock8</b>          | .8lock8                      |   | READ_IT.txt                   | Based on HiddenTear | AES(256)             |
| <b>AiraCrop</b>        | ._AiraCropEncrypted          |   | How to decrypt your files.txt | related to TeamXRat |                      |
| <b>AI-Namrood</b>      | .unavailable<br>.disappeared |   | Read_Me.Txt                   |                     |                      |
| <b>Alcatraz Locker</b> | .Alcatraz                    |   | ransomed.html                 |                     |                      |

Norsk Hydro was not an accidental, “WannaCry” style indiscriminate attack, but a deliberate, targeted strike on critical infrastructure.

# The Infection

The ransomware was dropped and executed by a renamed **PsExec tool**.

→ It is the same system administration tool abused by various ransomware such as **SOREBRECT** and **Bad Rabbit**.



# The Evasion

**Codesigning** was used in order to bypass the antivirus →  
Companies whitelist signed software.

Numerous vendors on the dark web sell such certificates for a relatively cheap price of between **500 and 1700 USD**, so signed ransomware is becoming increasingly common.

Хочу предложить Вам готовые, качественные сертификаты **CodeSigning Comodo** и **CodeSigning EV GlobalSign** с расширенной проверкой компании!

Цены на сертификаты следующие:

**CodeSigning - \$400**

**CodeSigning EV - \$1700**

**EV SSL - \$500**

Чистка от AB - \$150

telegram:

jabber: p

jabber2:

Сертификаты для подписи кода используются разработчиками для подписи своего программного обеспечения, чтобы доказать, что оно (ПО) не было изменено или скомпрометировано третьей стороной.

Несмотря на то, что программное обеспечение, приобретенное в розницу, как правило, считается относительно безопасным, программы, загружаемые из Интернета, часто подвергаются сомнению из-за широкого распространения вирусов и вредоносного ПО. Наличие цифрового сертификата подтверждает целостность (неизменность) программного кода с момента его выпуска. Соответственно, если ваш файл имеет цифровую подпись, пользователи будут относиться к ней с большой уверенностью при загрузке из Интернета или запуске.

Подписанный файл обходит блокировки многих антивирусов, а EV CodeSigning позволяет без набора репутации сертификата обходить SmartScreen!

Учитывая новые правила получения сертификатов, проще купить у нас, чем заморачиваться самим!

Сроки

Code Signing - 2-3 рабочих дней

Code Signing EV- до 10ти рабочих дней.


Гарант.

Сертификаты делаю строго под ключ.

К оплате принимаем: Bitcoin, Ethereum, Monero

# The Executable

It is a 32-bit executable compiled by VS2015.



# The Infection

**%TEMP%** directory,

```
cmd.exe /c move /y tgytutrcXXXX.exe %TEMP%\tgytutrcYYYY.exe
```

```
"C:\Windows\system32\wevtutil.exe" cl Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Trace
```

→ Ransom note and encryption process.

# The Infection

- The process with **-m** as the parameter is mainly for scheduling (System-wide lock- Mutex).
- “**-iSM-zzbdrimp -s**” create more child processes.
- The parent process detects the number of child processes. The number of child processes is the same as the number of CPU cores.
- The child process obtains the path of the file from the parent process, and the path name needs to be decoded by Base64.

```

401     if ( i != 1 )
402     {
403         do
404         {
405             sub_451320(v4, ebx0, v16, &v85, &v103); // 检查参数
406             v16 += 14;
407             ++v106;
408         }
409         while ( v106 < v96 );
410         v16 = v93;
411     }
412     sub_451320(v4, ebx0, (v94 - 56), v4, &v103); // 检查参
413     v106 = 0;
414     if ( i )

```

```

364     sub_486285("invalid mapK, !> key");
365     v34 = v31[15];
366     if ( !v34 )
367         std::Xbad_function_call();
368     (*(v34 + 8))(); // 不带参数 42F440(410C20) 42F450(410500) 42F440(410040)
369     ++v30; // 带-m参数 42F440(410C20) 42F440(400B10) 42F440(410D40)
370 // 带-s参数 42F440(410C20) 42F440(400000) 42F440(410040)
371     sub_419470(&v41, &v49, *v41, v41);
372     MemFree(v41);

```




# The Encryption; AES & RSA

**AES key to encrypt the file** using the AES algorithm.

Hard-coded RSA public key in the decoding program:

```
● 277 GetRandNum(1, &pbBuffer, 0x10u); // 使用微软密码学API获得16字节随机数
● 278 CryptoPP::RandomNumberGenerator::GenerateBlock(&dword_525548, &v117, 16); // 使用Cryptpp获得16字节随机数
● 279 v15 = sub_499588(60); // "software\Microsoft\Cryptography"
● 280 v15
```

# The Encryption; AES & RSA



# The Ransom

Manual process of email, using numerous **Protonmail**, mail.com and o2.pl email accounts



# Summary

**LockerGoga** encrypts various types of files, including executable files, system directories, and files in the startup directory.

**It is very destructive...**

It traverses files in the parent process, then encrypt files in multiple child processes, and leverage multiple cores of the CPU.

# The Detection

6 known samples of LockerGoga in the wild:

1.7bcd69b3085126f7e97406889f78ab74e87230c11812b79406d723a80c08dd26

2.C3d334cb7f6007c9ebee1a68c4f3f72eac9b3c102461d39f2a0a4b32a053843a

3.88d149f3e47dc337695d76da52b25660e3a454768af0d7e59c913995af496a0f

4.c97d9bbc80b573bdeeda3812f4d00e5183493dd0d5805e2508728f65977dda15

5.eda26a1cd80aac1c42cdbba9af813d9c4bc81f6052080bc33435d1e076e75aa0

6.ba15c27f26265f4b063b65654e9d7c248d0d651919fafb68cb4765d1e057f93f

# The Prevention

Measure  
Backup and Restore  
Process  
Block Macros  
Disable WSH  
Filter Attachments  
Level 1  
  
Filter Attachments  
Level 2  
Email Marking  
Restrict program  
execution  
Show File  
Extensions


Measure  
Enforce UAC Prompt  
Remove Admin  
Privileges  
Restrict Workstation  
Communication  
Sandboxing Email Input  
Execution Prevention  
Change Default "Open  
With" to Notepad  
File Screening  
Restrict program  
execution #2  
EMET  
Sysmon

## Wrong Assumptions

# Backup will **ALWAYS** save you !

If the ransomware encrypts the files, then it will encrypt the backup as well overwriting the good one...

# Who's in the game, yet ?





# Thank You

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